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Abstract 
Three influencing techniques were used to elicit objective, 
or immature, moral judgments from children who were shown to be 
subjective, or mature, on a pretest. The same techniques were 
used to elicit subjective moral judgments from objective children. 
The techniques were modeling, experimenter approval of the model's 
responses, and explanations of her responses by the model. The 
techniques were incorporated into four treaonents which included 
modeling alone, modeling plus approval, modeling plus explana-
tions, and modeling plus approval plus explanations. 
Ten moral judgment stories of the kind originated by Piaget 
were read to l6S elementary school children to determine their 
moral orientations. Each story described a well intentioned or 
accidental act which resulted in a great deal of material damage, 
contrasted with a selfishly motivated act which resulted in very 
little damage. One hundred boys and girls, aged 6-4 to 10-2, were 
selected as subjects. Half the children were decidedly objective 
in their responses to the pretest, and half were decidedly subjec-
tive. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four 
treatment groups or to a control group. 
During the experimental phase of the study the experimenter 
read moral judgment stories alternately to an adult female model 
and the individual subjects. The model responded in a fashion 
opposite that of the subject's orientation as measured by the 
pretest. In some cases her responses were approved by the exper-
imenter. In some cases she explained the rationale for her re-
sponses. Subjects in the control group heard the same stories 
- but were not exposed to a model, experimenter approval, or expla-
nations of any sort. Three weeks after the experimental phase all 
subjects were asked to respond to another set of moral judgment 
stories as a postte&t. Twenty additional subJects who were se-
lected at random from the original population as an additional 
control group also responded to the posttest. 
The results showed that objective and subjective subjects 
were significantly influenced by modeli.ng to adopt the alternate 
moral viewpoint. Objective children were more influenced toward 
subjectivity than subjective children were influenced toward ob-
jectivity. The most effective influencing technique was modeling 
alone. At no time did the experimenter's approval increase the 
degree to which the subjects were influenced to change. When the 
model explained her responses, objective children adopted the sub-
jective orientation more readily than when she did not. For sub-
jective children, however, the model's explanations did not result 
in a greater nwnber of objective responses. The sex of the sub-
jects was found to be of no consequence in terms of their suscep-
tibility to the influencing techniques. 
The results were discussed in terma of their relevance to 
Bandura's social learning theory and Piaget's cognitive develop-
ment theory. The powerful modelin~ effect was interpreted as 
lending supporc to Bandura's interpretation of moral development. 
Piaget's theory was supported by the demonstration that the mod-
el's explanations were effective only in influencing children in 
the direction of increasing subjectivity. Further research was 
suggested to clarify the relationship of moral judgment to moral 
behavior. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
People are confronted each day with the need to 
make decisions about the appropriate reactions to situa-
tions in which they are involved. When such decisions 
include "judgments about the good and right of action" 
(Kohlberg, 1964, p. 405) 1 the area of moral judgment is 
involved. The question of how people come to make the 
moral judgments which they do has been a focus of think-
ers since Meno asked Socrates how the concept of virtue 
is acquired by men. Theoretical explanations of the na-
ture of 1110ral development have ranged from emphasis on 
the emotional attachment between parent and child (Freud, 
1930) to the growing ability of the child to use his in-
tellect to assimilate new points of view and to empathize 
with them (Piaget, 1965). Early theorizing about the na-
ture of moral development was accompanied by little em-
pirical research except for the classical studies in 1928 
by Hartshorne and May and in 1932 by Piaget (Piaget, 
1965). A resurgence of interest in the area of moral 
judgment has been accompanied by considerable research in 
the past decade stemming largely from the work of 
Kohlberg and his associates (e.g. Kohlberg, 1963. 1964; 
- 1 -
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Krebs, 1968; Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1966). 
The present investigation is concerned with one 
aspect of the recent revival of interest in moral judg-
ments, specifically the effectiveness of several tech-
niques in influencing children to modify their moral 
judgments. To give perspective to the present investiga-
tion, a review of theoretical and empirical work in the 
area of moral development is a necessary precursor. 
Psychoanalytic Theor;y 2! Identification 
The psychoanalytic approach to the issue of moral 
development is concerned primarily with the affective 
interaction between the child and bis parents (Freud, 
1930). The basic vehicle for inculcation of moral 
values is considered in psychoanalytic theory to be the 
superego, that portion of Freud's tripartite intrapsychic 
model which is supposed to reflect parental (and there-
fore, cultural) values. Often referred to as a represen-
tation of the conscience, the superego condemns thought 
and behavior which transgresses the parental moral code 
and threatens punishment for such misbehavior. Partic-
ularly in the areas of agressive and sexual behavior, the 
- 3 -
auperego plays the role of moral overseer. 
The superego develops through the process of identi-
fication, according to psychoanalytic theory {Watson, 
1959). In normal development, children identify with the 
like-sexed parent, adopting that parent's modes of be-
havior and values. The Oedipal period is felt to be cru-
cial in the process of identification. In this period, 
girls identify with their mothers because of the threat 
of a loss of maternal love, which would result from 
mother - daughter competition for the father's affection. 
Boys identify with their fathers out of fear of potential 
castration which would be the result of competition for 
the mother. This period normally includes a child's 
fifth and sixth years, and the identification which is 
the result of the resolved Oedipal period leads to an 
adoption of the parent's value system, providing a basis 
for the superego's prohibitions and the ego ideal's pos-
itive strivings. 
The psychoanalytic theory of identification has been 
criticized for its emphasis upon data which cannot be 
directly observed but which have to be inferred from doll 
play, developmental reconstruction, or dream analysis 
(Bandura & Walters, 1963). The particular mechanisms by 
- 4 -
which the process of identification is supposed to take 
place are not clear in Freud's theory. Sears, Maccoby, 
and Levin (1957) suggested that identification takes 
place primarily through the child's active practicing of 
the roles of adults in his life, particularly his par-
ents. Through such role practice, theorized Sears 
et al., children insure themselves of continued parental 
affection because they adopt the parents' values and de-
velop a conscience. A similar theory has been advanced 
by Bandura and McDonald (1963), who have used a social 
learning framework for interpreting the tendency for 
children to adopt the attitudes and ideas of the same-sex 
parent. 
Finally, Sears, Rau, and Alpert (1965) have con-
cluded that it is unlikely that a single theoretical 
mechanism can account for the process of identification. 
They have proposed that the many different manifestations 
of mature conscience may develop in different ways. 
Piaget's Cognitive Theory 2! Moral Development 
Another way to approach the issue of moral develop-
ment is to focus primarily on cognitive judgments rather 
- 5 -
than the emotional aspects of socialization. This ap-
proach characterized the research of Margaret Schallen-
berger (1894), who analyzed the essays written by nearly 
3500 California children ranging from six to sixteen 
years in age. The essays were written in response to a 
story read to them about a girl who had painted all the 
parlor chairs with a new box of paints in order to make 
them look pretty. The children were asked to explain 
what they would have done if they were the mother in such 
a situation. Younger children advocated severe punish-
ment, such as whipping, and often cited a vengeful reason 
for the punishment. Older children, on the other hand, 
more often mentioned trying to reason with the child and 
reserved the use of strong physical punishment as a 
teaching device "to make sure she wouldn't do it again. tt 
(Schallenberger, 1894, p. 91). In summarizing the dif-
ferent approaches used by the children, Schallenberger 
reported that "young children judge of actions by their 
results, older ones look at the motives which prompt 
them." (p. 96) • 
. 
The strongest advocate and most prolific researcher 
for the cogniti~e approach to moral development has been 
Jean Piaget. Although he bas now abandoned this 
F 
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particular area of research, his early work (Piaget, 
1965) has provided the impetus for many other studies. 
There is no evidence that Piaget was acquainted with 
Schallenberger's research, but his technique for study-
ing moral judgments was a logical extension of hers and 
his findings were also similar to hers. 
Piaget's approach to moral development was similar 
to Schallenberger's in his emphasis on the judgments 
which children make about certain actions. This is in 
contrast to Piaget's contemporary, Freud, who focused on 
the emotional aspects of moral development, particularly 
as evidenced in the process of identification in the 
Oedipal period (Freud, 1930). Piaget also carried out 
empirical research to help form and then test his hypoth-
eses whereas Freud's theory derived primarily from his 
clinical experience with neurotic individuals. 
The techniques used by Piaget to gather data have 
often been criticized (Flavell, 1963), but his research 
has stimulated a great many further studies because of 
the fascinating things he found out about children in his 
relatively relaxed research style. In his investigations 
concerning moral judgment, Piaget and his associates 
interviewed Swiss children to learn how they formed 
F 
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judgments. In the first portion of the book which re-
sulted from these interviews, Piaget reported the various 
ways in which children make rules about playing games of 
marbles. He noted an orderly progression with increasing 
age through several stages concerning the rules of the 
game. Young children play without any formal rules and 
simply try to hit one another's marbles. As they grow 
older, children introduce competition and rules to give 
the players about the same chances for winning. Operating 
under a set of rules they at first tend to treat the 
rules as unbreakable and inflexible, considering them to 
have been laid down by some authority. Older children 
grow more tolerant of rule breaking ~men they realize 
that the rules are simply conveniences and can be altered 
if greater player equality or convenience can be achieved. 
More pertinent to this investigation, however, are 
the other techniques which Piaget used with the Swiss 
children. He and his associates told the children pairs 
of stories and asked them to make judgments about the 
characters and their actions. One of the pairs of sto-
ries he used was the following: 
A. A little boy who is called John is in his 
room. He is called to dinner. He goes 
into the dining room. But behind the door 
-- 8 -
there was a chair, and on the chair there 
was a tray with fifteen cups on it. John 
couldn't have known that there was all 
this behind the door. He goes in, the 
door knocks against the tray, bang go the 
fifteen cups and they all get broken! 
B. Once there was a little boy whose name was 
Henry. One day when his mother was out he 
tried to get some jam out of the cupboard. 
He climbed up on to a chair and stretched 
out his arm. But the jam was too high up 
and he couldn't reach it and have any. 
But while he was trying to get it he 
knocked over a cup. The cup fell down and 
broke. 
(Piaget, 1965, p. 122) 
Piaget asked the children he interviewed to name the 
naughtier of the two boys in the stories and to indicate 
how that judgment was made. He concluded that children 
form such moral judgments on the basis of different con• 
siderations at different ages. For example, young chil-
dren (up to about the age of eight years) reacted to mis• 
deeds in the stories by suggesting that the degree of 
blame was directly proportional to the degree of damage 
caused by the misdeed, regardless of the story charac-
ter's intent. This dimension of judgment was called 
"moral realism" by Piaget, and he theorized that it is 
the constraining attitude of adults which is largely re-
sponsible for such an attitude on the part of young 
children. Children with this point of view were said by 
Piaget to display "objective" moral judgment. Older 
pc 
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children, on the other hand, judged the boy to be naugh-
tier who intended to take some jam when his mother was 
absent, even though the resulting damage was relatively 
minor by comparison with that caused by the other boy. 
This was termed "subjective" moral judgment by Piaget. 
The different attitudes of younger and older children 
were similar to those described by Schallenberger. 
There were other aspects of moral judgment which 
Piaget defined through his interviews with children. For 
example, the younger children (again, up to about eight 
years) believed in ,.immanent justice." That is, they 
believed that because justice exists in all animate and 
inanimate things a person's misdeed will soon be punished 
even if it is never detected by another person. This was 
a popular children's explanation for accidents. Older 
children, however, subscribed to the notion that unfor-
tunate occurrences happen by chance rather than as a con-
sequence of one's previous misdemeanors. Piaget further 
found that young children believed that the most effec-
tive punishment is that which is very severe and is ori-
ented toward retribution and expiation, whereas older 
children rejected the idea that punishment must be severe 
in order to be effective and advocated restitution as a 
ps 
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fair means of righting a wrong. Again, the similarity 
to Schallenberger's findings is apparent. Finally, 
Piaget discovered that young children were willing to 
hold a group responsible for the actions of one member, 
while older children felt that each individual was re-
sponsible for his own actions. 
The particular aspect of moral judgment which has 
received the most attention from researchers following 
Piaget has been moral realism, possibly because it can 
be investigated in a relatively systematic fashion. 
Piaget theorized that the objective viewpoint of the 
young child, that deeds are to be judged in terms of 
their consequences and not by the intentions of the 
doers, is a result of the normal daily constraints put 
on the child's activities by his parents (Piaget, 1965). 
That is, there are many occasions in the life of the 
young child in which behavior is prohibited regardless 
of the child's intentions, such as playing with elec-
trical apparatuses or handling certain delicate objects. 
As the child grows older, however, he begins to interact 
with his peers on a regular basis. Piaget pointed to 
this experience as the opportunity for moral judgments 
to be formed on the basis of mutual need, much as 
pa 
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progressive experience with marble games leads to more 
democratic and more flexible rules. The adoption of a 
mature, or subjective, method of forming moral judgments 
results from the development of the idea of justice from 
cooperating with peers. 
Consistent with Piaget's general dialectical ap-
proach to child development, his theory of moral develop-
ment emphasizes the role of "social interaction (provid-
ing) an impetus for disturbing the present cognitive 
organization, leading to a state of disequilibration, 
and ultimately resulting in a new level of cognitive 
organization CT:owan, Langer, Heavenrich, & Nathanson, 
1969; p. 26~ • " Thus it is apparent that Piaget con-
ceives the development of the child's ability to make 
subjective moral judgments to be similar to development 
in other areas of logical thinking. For example, the 
young child comes to the notion of conservation of volume 
only by being exposed to demonstrations of the principle 
which he can understand. Such exposure forces a re• 
evaluation of the child's earlier belief that pouring a 
liquid from one container to another container of differ• 
ent size or shape brings about a change in the volume of 
the liquid (Piaget, 1950; Flavell, 1963). In a similar 
p 
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way Piaget argued that increasing cooperation and mutual 
respect among children forces a re-evaluation of the 
early objective attitude which regards rules as inflexi-
ble and focuses exclusively on the material results of 
one's misdeeds. 
The Relationshie Between Freud's !!.!'!.!! Piaget's Theories 
There have been attempts in recent years to place 
both Freud's theory of identification and Piaget's cogni-
tive theory of moral development into historical perspec-
tive and to show how they may be construed as complemen-
tary rather than competitive. For example Bobroff 
(1960) bas pointed out that both theories emphasize a 
progressive growth away from subjectivity (Piaget's 
"egocentrism," Freud's "autism") toward a realistic 
awareness of the self in relation to others. In each 
theory the self is seen as becoming increasingly differ-
entiated, Freud focusing primarily on internal dynamic 
development and Piaget stressing the child's relation-
ships with the external world. Bobroff attempted to 
demonstrate a similarity in the developmental sequence of 
the understanding of rules of marble games (such as 
Piaget described). and the progressive stages of ego 
p 
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development as revealed in children's Thematic Appercep-
tion Test stories. Bobroff's analysis of the date 
yielded by 32 normal and 32 retarded (IQ 60 - 80) boys 
indicated that four basic stages could be determined 
which were characteristic of the boys at different ages. 
The boys appeared to go through a particular stage in ego 
maturation, as shown in their TAT stories, at the same 
time they were in a comparable atage of socialization, as 
shown in their use of rules in games of marbles. Bobroff 
concluded that such a degree of consistency implied that 
Piaget's theory of mental growth and the psychoanalytic 
theory of ego development are really different kinds of 
descriptions of the same thing, namely, the child's de• 
veloping ability to relate to other people and empathize 
with them. 
Bobroff's research suggests that common ground may 
be found between the psychoanalytic and the Piagetian 
descriptions of the child's moral development. But cau-
tion is required in interpreting the results of his in-
vestigation. For example, he combined subjects of normal 
and defective intelligence into the same experimental 
groups. Although he attempted to equate the subjects for 
mental age within each group by including retarded 
- 14 -
children who were two chronological years older than the 
normal subjects, it is unclear from the data whether be 
was successful in creating groups which differed signif-
icantly from one another in mental age. Also questiona-
ble is the procedure by which Bobroff distinguished the 
various stages of the rules of the marble games. All 
that can be inferred from his report is that the stages 
seemed to differ in terms of rule consistency and com-
plexity and also the nature of the relationships among 
the players. He presented no data to support the asser-
tion that the stages did differ from one another in terms 
of objective measurements, such as the number of rules or 
frequency of interpersonal interaction. The stages of 
ego development were based on Henry's (1956) scheme for 
analyzing Thematic Apperception Test protocols, which is 
a systematic procedure based on enumeration of various 
story themas or content items. The above criticism of 
Bobroff 's research is not intended to downgrade his at· 
tempt to point out similarities between two different 
theories of moral development. It is quite possible that 
Freud and Piaget were describing different aspects of the 
same thing when they described identification and moral 
judgment, but Bobroff's research is not convincing in 
-- 15 -
this regard. 
Another attempt to draw a parallel between the 
psychoanalytic approach and Piaget's theories is an 
article by Nass (1966). He compared the morality of 
constraint (objective morality) in Piaget's theory to 
the developmental stage described by Freud in which the 
immature ego is unable to test reality (Nass, 1966). In 
a neo-Freudian exposition of ego development, Nass com-
pared the ego's capacity to cope with internal drives 
and the irrational superego as well as the pressures of 
the outside world to Piaget's description of the develop-
ment of subjective moral judgments which are based on 
mutual respect and cooperation. From Nass' point of 
view, psychoanalytic theory can form a broad theoretical 
background for interpreting the more specific observa-
tions of Piaget. While it may be true that similarities 
in approach and interpretation may be seen in the two 
theories, it does not seem logical to subsume one under 
the other, particularly when psychoanalytic theory is 
built primarily on what Nass described as "introspective 
reports, developmental reconstructions, and theoretical 
inferences [p. 6ij • " Nevertheless it is important to 
realize that both theories attempt to explain the process 
p 
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by which children become socialized in Western culture, 
and that it is possible that each may contribute heavily 
to some future integrated theory of socialization. 
I!!!. Piagetian Approach !9. Recent Years 
Piaget's work on moral judgment did not initially 
stimulate much further research, either by himself or by 
others. In a recent interview (Hall, 1970) Piaget in-
dicated that he became interested in other problems of 
child development and consequently neglected the area of 
moral judgment. He did direct a bit of research in 
Geneva by Lerner (1937), who found that the progression 
from objective to subjective morality is accompanied by 
an increase in empathic skill, the ability to anticipate 
the likely interests and reactions of another person in a 
social situation. But his book on moral judgment re-
mained untranslated into English until 1948, and American 
child psychologists were more interested in bis work on 
children's intellectual growth and their use of logic and 
reasoning. 
In the past decade, Lawrence Kohlberg bas used the 
Piagetian theory and technique as the basis for develop-
ing an expanded theory of moral development. In a review 
.... 
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of Piaget's theory, Kohlberg (1964) has presented data 
which support some of Piaget's ideas of moral development 
and fail to support others. His research technique con-
sisted primarily of asking children to make judgments 
about moral dilemmas, presented to them in story form. 
Some were derived directly from Piaget, while other s to-
ries were devised by Kohlberg to detect certain kinds of 
thinking. Like Piaget, Kohlberg found that young chil-
dren judge an act by its consequences, whereas older 
children judge it according to the intentions of the 
actor. Furthermore, young children judge deeds as to-
tally right or wrong, unlike older children who acknowl• 
edge the possibility of degrees of guilt and who recog-
nize that others may hold different opinions about the 
same deed. Also, young children often judge an act to 
be bad becaus• it elicits punishment, but older children 
use the criteria of rule violation or injury to others in 
order to judge an act. Piaget's observations of the 
young child's belief in "immanent justice,. and the effi-
cacy of harsh punishment were also confirmed by Kohll>erg. 
Piaget (1965) proposed still other characteristics 
of moral development which were not supported by Kohl-
berg' s research. For example, Kohlberg found no evidence 
... 
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that increasine; maturity in moral judgment was accompa-
nied by greater cooperation with and respect for peers. 
Nor did he fine that older children preferred to be held 
responsible for acts individually rather than collec-
tively. Kohlberg found that older children were not 
generally willing to delegate to authority the right to 
punish; instead they advocated direct retaliation by 
victims as means of settling grievances. Kohlberg point-
ed out that his and Piaget's investigations were carried 
out at much different times and in different cultures, 
and that the observations by Piaget which he failed to 
confirm were related primarily to social factors. Those 
observations which were confirmed were of differences 
between younger and older children in cognitive skills. 
As a result of his own and his colleagues' research 
(e.g., Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1966), 
Kohlberg has formulated B scheme of moral development 
which progresses through three levels, each level having 
two stages. This scheme directly reflects Piaget's 
theory in several respects. Both Kohlberg and Piaget 
feel that there is an invariant developmental sequence 
from im..11ature (objective) moral reasoning to mature 
(subjective) moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1964; Piaget, 
- 19 -
1965). That is, .:Joral developcrlent is seen as progressing 
from one stage to another without the possibility of 
omitting any stage because each is a necessary foundation 
for the next. In addition, Kohlberg (1964) agrees with 
Piaget that it is altogether possible for a child to make 
mature judgments in one area of moral development (e.g., 
Uloral realism) while continuing for a time to make inuna-
ture judgments in another area (e.g., immanent justice). 
Both writers also agree on the irreversibility of the 
process of moral development. That is, once a child has 
attained a subjective moral attitude (or has progressed 
from one level to another), he will not revert back to an 
earlier, less rnature, point of view in making moral judg-
ments (Rest, 1967). 
Kohlberg's stages of ~oral development represent an 
a~plification of Piaget's original objective-subjective 
dichotomy. With his defined stages and rnoral judgment 
stories it is possible to determine the degree of moral 
development of persons of all ages and in many different 
cultures (Kohlberg, 1968). He has found that children in 
Mexico, Taiwan, France, and the United States all pro• 
gress through the same stages of moral thought, and he 
has concluded that "the nature of (the) sequence is not 
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affected by widely varying social, cultural, or religious 
conditions. The only thing that is affected is the ~ 
at which individuals progress through this sequence 
[jcohlberg, 1968, p. 30] • " Kohlberg's scheme of moral 
development bas even been applied to the writings of 
statesmen and the thoughts of campus radicals. 
Like Piaget, Kohlberg ascribes growth in moral rea• 
soning to the increasing influence of the peer group. 
But he also believes that parents and society at large 
continue to exert an influence as the child matures. In 
fact, Kohlberg feels that children learn the same basic 
moral principles from all chief sources of influence. 
"Instead of participation in various groups causing con-
flicting developmental trends in morality, it appears 
that participation in various groups converges in stimu-
lating the development of basic moral virtues, which are 
not transmitted by one particular group as opposed to 
another lj(ohlberg, 1964, pp. 406-407] ." The peer group 
is particularly important for the development of mature 
moral judgments because of the increasing amount of time 
spent with peers as children grow older. The influence 
of peers on children's decisions has been shown by Utech 
and Hoving (1969) to increase relative t:> parental 
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influence as children grow older. 
lb!. Social-learning Theory Approach .!:,2. Moral Development 
Recent theoretical and empirical attempts to under-
stand how children come to make certain kinds of moral 
judgments have been made from a learning theory point of 
view. This approach conceives of moral development as a 
process of learning responses to particular situations in 
order to obtain a positive reinforcement or to avoid a 
negative reinforcement. Eysenck (1960) has defined moral 
judgment in the context of a learning theory model. 
According to him, conscience is 
a conditioned response built up during the 
child's formative years by the pairing of 
conditioned stimuli {arising from aggressive, 
predatory, and OYertly sexual actions) and 
unconditioned stimuli (slaps, beatings, 
'shaming', and other punishment) immediatel) 
following the conditioned stimuli. Aided by 
a process of stimulus generalization, this 
should, in the course of time, lead to an 
association between the conditioned stimulus 
and the fear-anxiety responses appropriate 
to the unconditioned stimulus. 
(Eysenck, 1960, p. 11) 
The learning theory approach rejects the emphasis upon 
internal dynamic tensions which are crucial to the psy-
choanalytic concept of identification. The process of 
identification is seen as the imitation of adult figures 
who have the power to dispense rewards. 
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Aronfreed (1968) has proposed that there are two 
basic mechanisms by which humans are socialized. The 
first is the use of a reward or punishment immediately 
following an act in order to increase or decrease the 
probability of its reoccurrence. This is the technique 
to which Eysenck was referring in his definition of 
conscience. A second mechanism is the learning of appro• 
priate actions through the observation of other people, 
particularly if the outcome of their behavior is appar• 
ent. This second procedure involves the imitation of 
social models, which involves the ability to cognitively 
represent to oneself the behavior of someone else and to 
then reproduce it. Aronfreed argued that imitation as a 
socialization mechanism only becomes effective when the 
child attains some empathic ability, since it is necessary 
for the child to appreciate the possibility of obtaining 
a reward or punishment for himself if he engages in the 
same activity as the model. 
The basis for Aronfreed's second socialization mecha-
nism is the large body of research which has appeared in 
recent years which reveals that the behavior of a model 
can influence behavior in observers. For example, exper• 
irnental subjects have imitated models• aggressive 
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behaviors (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961), standards for 
self-reward or punishment (Bandura & Kupers, 1963), and 
euphoric behavior (Schachter & Singer, 1962). 
There is one study of the influence of models upon 
the behavior of observers which is directly relevant to 
the topic of this paper. This is the investigation re• 
ported by Bandura and McDonald (1963), in which children 
who were exposed to models who advocated a particular 
moral orientation adopted that orientation for themselves. 
Bandura and McDonald classified boys and girls as objec-
tive or subjective in their moral attitudes by means of a 
pretest based on Piaget's story items. Some items were 
taken directly from Piaget's book and others were devised 
by the investigators along the same lines as the original 
items. Forty-eight children who advocated the subjective 
moral orientation and 36 others who were objective were 
identified by the 12-item pretest. Each child was then 
individually exposed to an adult female model who re-
sponded to another set of stories based on Piaget's 
items. The model was instructed to respond in a manner 
contrary to the child's moral orientation as determined 
in the pretest. Thus if a child had given subjective 
responses on the pretest, the model gave objective 
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responses. The experimenter alternately read stories to 
the model and the child, each answering in the presence 
of the other. Immediately following this phase, in which 
they had been exposed to the model, the children were 
taken by a different experimenter to a different room and 
were asked to respond to still another set of moral judg• 
ment stories without any model being present. Bandura 
and McDonald found that there was a significant tendency 
for the children to abandon their initial moral orienta-
tions, as measured by the pretest, and to adopt the ori-
entation advocated by the model. This newly adopted 
orientation was maintained during the posttest in the 
absence of the model. 
The experiment by Bandura and McDonald is signifi-
cant for several reasons. First, they used the same 
criteria as Piaget for measuring moral orientation and 
then demonstrated that the children's judgments could be 
altered simply by exposing them to a model who advocated 
a different point of view. According to Piaget, such a 
reorientation as seemed to take place in Bandura and 
McDonald's study should have taken place only after in-
creasing peer cooperation and respect, resulting in a 
complete readjustment of cognitive structures. Another 
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significant aspect of the Bandura and McDonald study is 
that they found that it made no difference if the subject 
was verbally reinforced by the experimenter for changing 
his moral orientation. Subjects who were not reinforced 
altered their responses as much as those who were rein-
forced, as long as they were exposed to a model who was 
reinforced by the experimenter for answering as she did. 
In fact, subjects who were reinforced for changing their 
moral attitudes but who were not exposed to any model 
did not significantly alter their responses. Thus it 
would seem that the powerful influencing factor was the 
model exposure, not the rewards received by the subjects. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Bandura 
and McDonald study is the fact that both objective and 
subjective children were influenced to approximately the 
same degree to alter their responses in the direction 
advocated by the model. As it has already been pointed 
out, Piaget and Kohlberg have stated that it is not to 
be expected that children will regress in their moral 
orientations, and that theoretically they should only be 
able to be influenced to go from an objective to a sub-
jective view. The demonstration by Bandura and McDonald 
that subjective children can be influenced toward 
--
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objectivity calls Piaget's thinking on this issue into 
doubt. 
The Bandura and McDonald study has been criticized 
recently on theoretical as well as methodological grounds 
by Cowan et al. (1969). For example, they pointed out 
that Piaget's "stage" theory of moral development allows 
for a great deal of flexibility in terms of the age at 
which a child may abandon the objective attitude and 
adopt the subjective point of view. They noted that 
Bandura and McDonald (1963) had interpreted Piaget's 
theory in a rigid fashion, saying that there are two 
clear-cut stages of moral judgment, demarcated from each 
other at about age seven. Furthermore, Cowan et al. 
argued that Piaget has made it clear that social inter-
action is crucial to the adoption of a subjective moral 
attitude, and that Bandura and McDonald were wrong in 
implying that Piaget conceived ot moral development as 
the natural unfolding of innate propensities. 
One of the methodological criticisms of the Bandura 
and McDonald study made by Cowan et al. was that children 
had been used as subjects who were apparently in a tran-
sitional period, averaging about 20 per cent of their 
pretest responses in the to-be•conditioned direction. 
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In their own modification of the experiment, Cowan et al. 
included children judged to be definitely objective or 
subjective as well as some who were transitional. They 
also criticized the fact that the posttest came immedi-
ately after the modeling phase in the Bandura and 
McDonald experiment, and in their own modification in-
cluded an immediate posttest for some subjects and a 
posttest after a period of two weeks for other subjects. 
Cowan et al. also objected to the fact that Bandura and 
McDonald had considered only the children's responses 
which named the ''naughtier" story character without con-
sidering the children's explanations for their responses. 
Cowan et al. considered both types of responses in their 
experiment. 
In spite of all the criticisms they leveled at the 
Bandura and McDonald study, Cowan et al. found nearly 
the same results when they replicated the experiment 
with their own modifications. Reflecting on the results 
of the Cowan et al. investigation, Bandura (l969b) 
commented, 
Consistent with the results of the previous 
experiment, the authors found that modeling 
emerges as a significant determinent of moral judgments regardless of the direction in which judgmental behavior is being modified, the 
time at which the post exposure tests are 
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administered, and whether the analysis 
is made in terms of the children's judgments or the reasons they give for 
their dee is ions • 
(p. 275) 
The fact that models can indeed influence children 
to alter their moral judg.~ents appears to have been 
established by the Bandura and McDonald and the Cowan 
et al. studies. The larger question of just bow chil-
dren's moral judgments are influenced by models is not 
answered by those investigations, however. An attempt 
to isolate some of the critical factors in model influ-
ence has been made by Dworkin (1968). He pointed out 
that although the Bandura and McDonald experiment dem-
onstrated the effectiveness of models as a means of 
altering children's moral judgments, it is impossible to 
determine from that experiment just what factors may 
have been important or crucial in influencing the chil-
dren's judgments. Dworkin showed that in the modeling 
phase of the Bandura and McDonald study the model an-
swered in a manner contrary to the subject's pretest 
orientation and included in her answer not only the name 
of the naughtier person (identification) but also an ex• 
planation (cognitive information) about why she con-
sidered that person to be naughtier than tbe other. In 
addition, the model was verbally reinforced by the 
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experimenter each time she responded. Dworkin reasoned 
that the children in the Bandura and McDonald study could 
have learned the concept of intentionality in several 
ways. First, they may have simply imitated the model and 
always responded with the name of the person who intended 
mischief. Second, they could have used the cognitive ex-
planation, or rationale, which the model gave for identi-
fying the naughtier person. Finally, the children may 
have reacted to the reinforcement which the model always 
received when she responded, and may have thereby re• 
sponded ln a manner similar to the model's. Dworkin 
attempted to separate these possible methods of learning 
the concept of intentionality. He also included an im-
portant control condition which neither Bandura and 
McDonald nor the Cowan et al. studies had included. 
The experimental design used by Dworkin was based 
on the model of the Bandura and McDonald experiment. It 
involved a pretest to establish the children's base rates 
of responding, an experimental phase in which the chil-
dren were individually exposed to an adult female model, 
and finally a posttest after a period of three weeks. In 
the experimental phase, sotue children were exposed to a 
model who merely specified the name of the story character 
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whom she considered naughtier. In some cases the model 
was reinforced by the experimenter for her response. 
Some children saw a model who not only named the naught-
ier story character but also justified her answer by 
appealing to the concept of intentionality. All the sub-
jects were girls, and all were influenced in the direc-
tion of intentionality (subjectivity). The control con-
dition included children who were pretested, then read 
stories by the experimenter with es?. model present, and 
finally posttested. 
As in the studies cited earlier, Dworkin found that 
his subjects shifted their moral judgments to a signifi-
cant degree in the direction advocated by the model. The 
most effective technique was that which included cogni-
tive information, as shown by the fact that subjects in 
this condition altered their judgments to a greater de-
gree than did the subjects in the other conditions. For 
all bis subjects, the relative amount of shift in moral 
orientation was maintained over a period of three weeks 
until the postteat was administered. Dworkin concluded 
that the most effective moral training technique would 
be one which focused on cognitive processes, communicat-
ing to the child the relevant cognitive dimensions of the 
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moral concept being taught. 
Major Issues !n £!!!. !.£!.!, 2! Moral Judgment Today 
There are several unresolved issues to which the pres-
ent experiment has been directed. Foremost among these is 
the process by which children acquired a mature, or sub-
jective, moral point of view. The theoretical and empiri-
cal works of Freud and Piaget on this point have been 
briefly reviewed, as well as the learning theory point of 
view, particularly as advocated by Bandura. Freud's theo-
ry of identification is based primarily on inferences 
gained from clinical work with neurotic individuals in 
which introspective reports, dream analysis, and develop-
mental reconstructions constitute the major source of data. 
Such a theory does not easily lend itself to experimental 
verification. 
Piaget's theory is more readily translated into exper• 
imental manipulation since it is derived primarily from em-
pirical observations and tests. The modeling technique de-
scribed by Bandura and McDonald (1963) appears to be a good 
procedure by which to test some of Piaget's notions. this 
has already been done, with Bandura and McDonald and Cowan 
et al. demonstrating how models can be used to alter the 
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illOral judgments of children without any reference to in-
creasing or decreasing peer cooperation and respect. These 
latter two investigations have also demonstrated that it is 
possible to influence children from a subjective to an ob-
Jective attitude, something which does not seem to fit in 
with Piaget's theory. Finally, Dworkin (1968) has de-
scribed some factors in the modeling situation which appear 
efficacious in influencing children's moral judgments. 
The issue of the process by which models influence the 
moral judgments of children bas not been completely re-
solved by Dworkin's work. For example, Dworkin analyzed 
the effects of modeling alone, modeling plus reinforcement, 
and modeling plus cognitive information. The present ex-
periment analyzed those effects as well as the effect of 
cognitive information combined with modeling and rein-
forcement. Furthermore, the cumulative effects of exposure 
to Piaget-type moral judgment stories have not been stud• 
iad. Thus the present investigation included a control 
group which received only a posttest without prior exposure 
to the pretest or modeling. 
The investigation by Bandura and McDonald (1963) has 
been the only one in which the effects of the children's 
sex has been systematically studied concerning their 
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susceptibility to models who advocate different moral 
viewpoints. Their study revealed no differences between 
the moral judgment responses of boys and girls before or 
after they were exposed to the models. The study by Cowan 
et al. (1969) included both boys and girls, but their re-
sponses were not analyzed separately by sex. Dworkin's 
(1968) study involved only girls. 
Although sex was not an important variable in the 
Bandura and McDonald (1963) experiment, other studies in-
dicate that sex should continue to be investigated in the 
context of children's moral judgments. For example, 
Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1961) have reported that boys im-
itate the aggressive acts of a model to a significantly 
greater extent than girls. Likewise Sears et al. (1957) 
reported that in their daily activities and doll play boys 
consistently displayed more overt aggression than girls. 
The most aggressive boys were those whose fathers provided 
aggressive models. Since aggression is often linked with 
moral issues in our society and either directly or indi• 
rectly is the topic of many of Piaget's moral judgment 
stories, it is reasonable to believe that differences may 
be found between boys and girls in terms of their suseep-
tibility to a model who advocates an 
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Sex does not appear to be a significant variable when 
knowledge of basic moral virtues or resistance to tempta-
tion is considered. Hartshorne and May (1928) found that 
boys and girls were equally familiar with moral rules and 
also equally susceptible to neglecting these principles 
when given the opportunity to do so without being caught. 
Krebs (1968) has reported similar findings. According to 
Kohlberg's (1963) six-stage model of moral maturity, the 
girls and boys in Krebs 1 study scored at the same level. 
And girls and boys succumbed equally often to the tempta-
tion of cheating at a game in order to win prizes. In 
spite of these findings, Krebs reported that teachers con-
sistently rated girls as more moral than boys. 
The present investigation included both boys and 
girls and analyzed their responses separately in an at-
tempt to replicate Bandura and McDonald's {1963) study. 
Finally, the question of reversibility of moral at• 
titude should be focused upon. Piaget, Kohlberg, and 
Kohlberg's associates {Rest, 1968; Reat, Turiel, & 
Kohlberg, 1969) have argued that moral development is 
essentially an irreversible process. That is, develop-
ment can proceed in the direction of greater maturity, 
but children cannot really be influenced to adopt a less 
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mature point of view. The work of Turiel (1966), often 
cited, demonstrated that children prefer moral judgments 
one or two levels above their own level (in the Kohlberg 
scheme) rather than judgments which are one level below 
their present level. In contrast to this are the inves• 
tigations by Bandura and McDonald (1963) and Cowan et al. 
{1969), which did demonstrate that children can be influ-
enced toward objective moral reasoning even though they 
previously used subjective moral reasoning. Furthermore, 
LeFurgy and Woloshin {1968) showed that children can be 
influenced toward objective moral judgments by means of 
peer influence. These inveetigators used tape recorded 
responses by the subjects• peers (acting as the experi-
menter's confederates) to influence the subjects to adopt 
a different moral point of view. Turiel (1969) has ar• 
gued that the children in such experiments do not actually 
adopt the model's mode of thinking, but that they simply 
acquiesce in order to obtain social reinforcement. For 
this reason the present investigation included several 
different techniques to influence children to respond in a 
manner contrary to their original orientations. These 
techniques employed logical explanations and social rein-
forcement singly and in cornbiua tion so tba t the relative 
---
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importance of each could be demonstrated. 
Although it would appear to have been established 
that subjective children can be influenced to adopt objec-
tive moral reasoning, the question remains as to whether 
such influence is as effective in the first place or as 
long-lasting as when objective children are influenced 
toward subjective moral reasoning. This is an important 
point, for Bandura's (1969) theoretical position is that 
it should be equally possible to influence children in ei-
ther direction. Cowan et al. (1969) have claimed that 
their data showed that objective children were influenced 
more toward subjectivity than subjective children were 
influenced toward objectivity. Bandura (1969) has pointed 
out, however, that this contention is not supported by 
quantitative analysis of the data, but only by visual in-
spection of one of their printed figures. A similar com-
ment can be made concerning the figures of LeFurgy and 
Woloshin (1968). which appear to show that children are 
more readily influenced in the "natural" direction (toward 
subjectivity). This observation has not been supported by 
statistical analysis, however. Thus it remains an open 
question as to whether children can be as readily influ-
enced to adopt an objective moral orientation as they 
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can be influenced toward a subjective orientation. For 
this reason the present investigation included an attempt 
to influence objective children toward subjectivity and 
vice versa, in hopes of contributing to a resolution of 
the theoretical difference between Piaget's stage theory 
and Bandura's social learning theory. 
The Present Investigation 
The experiment reported here has relied heavily on 
the research of Bandura and McDonald (1963) and Dworkin 
(1968). The first purpose of the experiment has been to 
demonstrate the fact that it is possible to use models to 
influence children to make certain kinds of moral judg-
ments. The other pur~ose has been to experimentally test 
the following hypotheses: 
1. The influencing techniques used in the present 
experiment differ in the degree to which they bring 
about changes in children's moral judgments. In 
order of decreasing effectiveness the techniques are 
modeling plus reinforcement plus cognitive infor-
mation, i:nodeling plus cognitive information, modeling 
plus reinforcement, and modeling alone. 
2. Objective children are more influenced to alter 
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their moral judglllents than subjective children. 
3. Children differ in susceptibility to influences 
to change their moral judgments according to their 
sex. 
Chapter II 
Method 
Subjects 
A total of 168 children from two Lutheran elementary 
schools in Chicago were pretested with a set of 10 moral 
judgment stories. Fifty boys, aged 6-4 to 9•11, and 50 
girls, aged 6-6 to 10-2 were selected as subjects on the 
basis of their pretest scores. Half the boys and half the 
girls were decidedly "objective" in their moral orienta-
tions, having responded in a subjective fashion on the 
pretest a mean number of only l.76 times. The remaining 
children were decidedly "subjective", having responded in 
a subjective fashion on the pretest a mean number of 8.52 
times. 
An additional 20 subjects were chosen at random from 
the classrooms which served as a source for the original 
sample of 168 subjects. These 10 boys and 10 girls formed 
one of the control groups, and were exposed only to the 
posttest. The boys ranged in age from 6-5 to 9-7, the 
girls from 6-6 to 9-8. 
The author of this study served as the experimenter. 
The models were two female undergraduate students from 
Northwestern University. 
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Stimulus Materials 
The moral judgment stories were obtained from the 
1 
work of Dworkin (1968). Following his procedure, the 
subjects were individually presented with pairs of sto-
ries, each of which described a well intentioned or acci-
dental act which resulted in a great deal of material 
damage, contrasted with a selfishly motivated act which 
resulted in very little damage. The subjects were given 
the following instructions: 
I have some stories to read to you. I am 
interested in knowing what you think about 
them. Each story will tell about two dif-
ferent children and the things they do. I 
want you to listen very carefully because 
after each story I will ask you some ques-
tions. Here is the first story. 
The first story in Appendix A was then read by the 
experimenter. At the end of the story, the subject was 
asked, "Who do you think did the naughtier thing, Oscar 
the first boy, or Bill the second boy?" After the sub-
ject's response he was asked ''Why do you think was 
naughtier than ?" 
During the experimental treatment phase. the same 
instructions and questions were read to the model, who 
1 Appreciation is expressed to Dr. Earl Dworkin, who 
granted permission for the use of the moral judgment 
stories. 
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was presented to the child subject as a naive subject. 
The experLuenter read the first story to the model, the 
second to the subject, and so forth. The stories used in 
the experimental phase for the subjects are found in Ap-
pendix B, and in Appendix C for the models. The stories 
used for the posttest are in Appendix D. 
Design 
The experimental design for the present study is sum-
marized in Table 1. The basic design of Dworkin's (1968) 
study was followed, which was in turn based largely on the 
work of Bandura and McDonald (1963). 
The present investigation included children as sub-
jects whose initial moral orientations were either objec-
tive or subjective. Several different procedures were 
used to influence objective children to give subjective 
responses and to elicit objective responses from subjec-
tive children. In the first procedure, Treatment l, the 
model responded to all the moral judgment stories by sim-
ply naming the person in the story whom she considered to 
be naughtier. The experimenter verbally approved the mod-
el's responses by saying "Good" or "A fine answer" after 
each response. In treatment 2, the model also responded 
with the names of the naughty story characters, but her 
TABLE 1 
Summary of the Experimental Design 
E xperimenta 1 
Group 
Phase I: Pretest 
to establish the 
baseline moral 
judgments of the 
subjects (objec-
tive or subjective). 
Group A: Pretest for all 
Objective subjects. 
boys (N•25) 
Phase II: Experimental 
phase. Subjects are 
exposed to a model who 
advocates the opposite 
moral orientation. 
Treatment 1. Model 
gives names of 
naughty story char-
acters. Experimenter 
approves. (N•5) 
Treatment 2. Model 
gives names. Exper-
imenter is neutral. 
(N•S) 
Treatment 3. Model 
gives names elua 
explanatlOns. 
Experimenter approves. 
(N•5) 
Treatment 4. Model 
gives names plus 
explana tlons. 
Experlillenter is 
neutral. (N•5) 
Treatment 5. Control 
group. Neutral 
experimenter reads 
stories. No model. (N•5) 
Phase III: Posttest 
after three weeks. 
Subjects respond to 
stories as in pre-
test, but with no 
model present. 
Posttest for all 
subjects. 
~ 
N 
TABLE l (Continued) 
Experimental 
Group 
Phase I: Pretest. Phase II: Experimental 
phase. 
Phase III: Posttest. 
Group B: 
Subjective 
boys (N•25) 
Pretest for all 
subjects. 
Treatment 1. As in Group A. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Post test for 
all subjects. 
Group C: Pretest for-all Treatment 1. As in Group A-.-t>Osfte_s_t_xor 
Objective subjects. 2. all subjects. 
girls (N•25) 3. 
Group D: Pretest for all 
Subjective subjects. 
girls (Na25) 
Group E: 
10 boys, 10 
girls se-
lected at 
random from 
population 
sources of 
Groups A,B,C, 
and o. 
No pretest for 
any subjects. 
4. 
5. 
Treatment 1. As in Group A. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
No treatments for any 
subjects. 
Posttest for 
all subjects. 
Posttest for 
all subjects. 
~ 
w 
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answers were not approved by the experimenter. Treatment 
3 included explanations by the model as to why she named a 
particular person as naughtier. When the model attempted 
to influence children toward subjectivity her explanations 
focused on the intentions of the story characters. She 
stressed the relative amounts of physical damage when chil-
dren were influenced toward objectivity. The model's re-
sponses in Treatment 3 were verbally approved by the ex-
perimenter. Treatment 4 was identical to Treatment 3 ex-
cept the experimenter's approval was omitted. 
Treatment S was a control condition in which the ex-
perimenter asked subjects to respond to moral judgment sto-
ries in the absence of any model. An additional control 
group is listed in Table 1 as Group E. Subjects in this 
group were exposed only to the posttest, and were not pre-
tested or influenced by models. 
The design of the present investigation made possible 
the separate analyses of the moral judgment responses of 
boys and girls. Thus the subjects' responses were analyzed 
according to the subjects' sex, initial moral orientations, 
and treatments. 
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Procedure 
After obtaining the permission of the school adminis-
trators and teachers directly involved with the study, the 
experimenter visited each of the classrooms which furnished 
subjects for the study. He was introduced to the children 
by the teacher as a man who was interested in learning what 
children thought of some stories. The experimenter ex-
plained that he would ask some of the children to come with 
him to listen to the stories, and that some would be asked 
to listen more than one time. He emphasized that the pro-
cedure by which be chose children was governed by chance 
and that children could not expect to be chosen on the 
basis of grades, appearance, or special pleading. 
Phase I: Pretest to establish baseline moral judg-
ments of the subjects. In this phase the experimenter read 
the 10 pairs of pretest stories to children individually to 
determine their base rates of responding. In order to ob-
tain a sample of 50 objective and 50 subjective children, 
168 children were pretested. The children were chosen at 
random from a master list of the first four grades at each 
school and were seen privately by the experimenter. Sub-
jects were classified as objective if they responded to the 
stories in a mature fashion O, l, 2, or 3 times. Subjects 
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who responded maturely 7, 8, 9, or 10 times were classified 
as subjective. Those children who were transitional, re-
sponding maturely 4, 5, or 6 times, were not used as sub-
jects for the remaining phases of the experiment. When 25 
subjects for each of the major groups listed in Table 1 had 
been selected, they were randomly assigned to the five 
treatments, with the provision that each treatment included 
five subjects. 
Each child was cautioned at the conclusion of the pre-
test phase not to discuss any of the stories with class• 
mates or siblings. The teachers were also asked to dis-
courage any such discussion, and they reported that the 
children were very good about "keeping the stories a sur-
prise for the others." 
Phase ll: Experimental treatment. Approximately ten 
days intervened between the pretest and this phase of the 
experiment. The subjects were again seen individually by 
the experimenter in the same room that was used for pre-
testing. The experimenter explained to each subject that 
he had still another set of stories to read to him. He 
also explained the presence of the female model by saying 
that he was interested in learning the reactions of grown• 
ups to these kinds of stories, and that he bad asked her 
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to come to the school to listen with the children in order 
to aave time. The experimenter read the instructions to 
the model and pointed out to the subject that the procedure 
was the same as in the pretest. The first story was then 
xead to the model, the second to the subject, and so forth. 
The model was instructed by the experimenter to re-
spond to the stories in a fashion contrary to the subject's 
pretest orientation. Thus if the subject responded objec-
tively on the pretest, the model responded subjectively. 
If the experimental condition required, the model explained 
her choice of the naughtier story character, and the exper-
imenter approved her response. If the model's responses 
were approved, so were the subject's whenever they agreed 
with the model's moral orientation. 
Twenty subjects were not exposed to a model during the 
experimental phase. These subjects comprised a control 
group which heard the same stories as the other subjects, 
but which was not exposed to a model. At the conclusion 
of this phase, all subjects were cautioned not to discuss 
any of the details with their classmates or siblings. 
Phase IIJ: Posttest. After a period of time averag-
ing 20 days since the experimental phase each subject was 
exposed to a final set of ten moral judgment stories. The 
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subjects were told that the experimenter wanted to learn 
thei,.: ideas about some new stories which were similar to 
those they had heard before. At the completion of this 
phase, each subject was thanked for his cooperation and was 
urged not to discuss the stories with his classmates or 
siblings. 
Twenty subjects who had been selected at random from 
the classrooms which supplied the original 168 subjects for 
the pretest were exposed to the posttest stories. These 
subjects had not heard the pretest or experimental stories, 
and it was determined through questioning that they had not 
been previously briefed by other subjects. These 20 sub-
jects formed the second control group. 
After all the subjects had gone through the final 
phase of the experiment the experimenter again visited each 
of the classrooms to thank the children and to debrief 
them. It was felt that a debriefing was necessary in order 
to eliminate any confusion the subjective children may have 
felt after being exposed to a model who advocated the ob-
jective, or immature point of view. The experimenter read 
three of the moral judgment stories to each class and ex-
plained why he felt that the subjective orientation was 
correct. He also explained that the model bad advocated a 
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different position from their own in order to see if the 
children would adopt her viewpoint. Nearly all the chil· 
dren said they were sure that they had not been influenced 
by the model's responses, and they did not appear to have 
been confused by the experience. The debriefing procedure 
had the additional benefit of including those children who 
had felt left out because they had not been chosen as sub-
jects or because they had heard stories only one time. 
Chapter III 
Results 
Results Pertaining ~ Sh! El§P!rimental Subjects 
The data resulting from tbe 80 experimental subjects 
were subjected to a repeated measures analysis of variance. 
Among the variables examined in this analysis were the 
initial moral orientations of the subjects (two levels of 
maturity• objective and subjective), the four experimental 
treatments, the sex of the subjects, and the three phases 
of the experiment. For all subjects, the unit of measure 
was the number of subjective moral judgments made during 
each phase of the experiment. This analysis is summarized 
in Table 2. 
Of the many variables examined, only two proved to be 
significant sources of variance. These were the Maturity 
([•43.68; ,!!!•l,64; e.< .001) and Phases (!•6.76; .!!!•2,128; 
E. < .005) \Fariables. Also significant was the interaction 
between them (f.•51.27; 2!•2,128; e.<.001). The significant 
Maturity variable reflects the fact that the subjects in 
the present study were selected on the basis of their 
scores in the pretest phase as either objecti~e (immature) 
or subjective (mature) in tneir moral orientations. Thus 
the two groups were decidedly different in terms of 
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Table 2 
Analysis of variance of Subjective Moral Judgment 
Responses by all Experimental Subjects 
Source df MS F 
- - -
Total 239 
Between Subjects 79 
Objective/Subjective 
Orientation (Maturity) l 507.51 43.68**** 
Sex l 14.51 1.25 
Treatments 3 1.02 0.09 
Maturity x Sex 1 12.61 1.09 
Maturity x Treatments 3 22.66 l.95 
Treatments x Sex 3 20.90 1.80 
Treatments x Sex x Maturity 3 9.71 0.84 
Error Between 64 11.62 
**** I?.<. 001 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Source 
Within Subjects 
Phases of Experiment 
Phases x Maturity 
Phases x Sex 
Phases x Treatments 
Phases x Sex x Maturity 
Phases x Treatments 
Phases x Tr ea tmen ts 
Phases x Treatments 
Maturity 
Error Within 
*** e. <.005 
**** 2<.001 
x Maturity 
x Sex 
x Sex x 
df 
-
160 
2 
2 
2 
6 
2 
6 
6 
6 
128 
~ F 
-
31.91 6. 76*** 
242.01 51.27**** 
8.64 1.83 
3.70 0.78 
3.57 0.76 
8.53 1.81 
4.06 0.86 
7.30 1.55 
4. 72 
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maturity of moral judgments. Figure l illustrates the 
fact that the 40 objective subjects began the experiment 
with a mean nwnber of l.76 subjective moral judgments on 
the pretest, whereas the 40 subjective subjects began with 
a mean number of 8.52 subjective judgments. Figure 1 also 
indicates that a difference between the objective and sub-
jective groups continued to exist throughout the three 
phases of the experiment, although interaction over the 
phases is apparent. 
After the two groups of subjects were purposely se-
lected to be of greatly different moral orientationa, ef-
forts were made to influence the objective children to 
make subjective judgments and to influence the subjective 
children to make objective judgments. The significant 
interaction between Maturity and Phases reported in Table 
2 is thus an artifact of the preselection and experimental 
procedures. 
Table 2 indicates that Phases alone proved to be a 
significant variable in the present experiment. Figure 2 
reveals that when the data from all the experimental sub-
jects are considered together, there was a significant 
trend toward increasing subjectivity over the three phases 
of the experiment. It should be remembered that the 
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objective and subjective groups of subjects were equal in 
number and received the same kinds of influences toward 
the opposite sorts of lllOral judgments. Thus it can be 
concluded that the subjects of an objective orientation 
were more influenced toward subjectivity than subjective 
subjects were influenced toward objectivity. The second 
hypothesis was thereby supported. 
The analysis summarized in Table 2 revealed that the 
subjects' sex did not affect the degree to which they were 
influenced to change their moral judgments. The third 
hypothesis, that children would differ in susceptibility 
to influence according to their sex, was not supported. 
Results Pertaining £2. .£!!!. Effects 2! £!!.!. Treatments Y22,!! 
£!l!. Objective !.!!!! Subjective Groups 2! Subjects 
The first hypothesis of the present study was that the 
effects of the several treatments would be different, as 
reflected in the relative amounts of change of the sub-
jects' moral judgments. Further analysis was required to 
adequately test this hypothesis, since the analysis summa-
rized in Table 2 included subjects who were influenced to· 
ward greater subjectivity as well aa subjects who were in-
fluenced toward greater objectivity. By including both 
groups of subjects, who were influenced in opposite direc-
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tions, the possible different effects of the treatments 
were obscured. 
Because the analysis summarized in Table 2 indicated 
that the sex of the subjects was not a significant variable 
in the present study, and because separate analyses for 
objective and subjective subjects were necessary in order 
to determine the effects of Treatments, the data for the 
sexes were combined and then analyzed separately according 
to the subjects' moral orientations on the pretest. These 
data are summarized in Table 3. 
The four experimental treatments differed from one 
another in terms of the inclusion or exclusion of the mod-
el' a explanations for her response& and also the inclusion 
or exclusion of the experimenter's verbal approval of the 
model's responses. Thus Treatment l involved no explana-
tions by the model, plus the experimenter's approval. 
Treatment 2 included no explanations and no approval. 
Treatment 3 incorporated explanations as well as approval. 
Treatment 4 utilized explanations, but without the experi-
menter's approval. Modeling was incorporated into each 
treatment. It was hypothesized that the four experimental 
treatments would result in significantly different numbers 
of subjective moral judgments. To test this hypothesis, 
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Table 3 
Mean Number of Subjective Moral Judgments 
Made by Objective and Subjective Subjects in Four 
Experimental Treatments at Three Phases of the Experiment 
Objective Subjects 
Pretest Phase Experimental Phase Posttest Phase 
Mean S.D. Mean LA:.. Mean S.D. 
- - - -
Treatment 1 2.20 0.92 5.20 3.33 4.80 3.74 
Treatment 2 l.80 1.14 4.00 3.23 5.20 3.16 
Treatment 3 l.70 1.16 5.70 3.53 8.20 2.10 
Treatment 4 1.10 0.99 4.70 2.71 6.30 3.33 
Subjective Subjects 
Pretest Phase Experimental Phase Posttest Phase 
Mean S.D. Mean ~ Mean §..:Jh 
- - - -
Treatment l 8.60 1.17 5.80 2.35 6.50 3.06 
Treatment 2 8.80 1.03 6.20 2.97 8.10 3.38 
Treatment 3 8.10 0.99 5.80 3.16 5.30 3.46 
Treatment 4 8.90 1.20 7.00 3.50 6.70 3.86 
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simple analyses of variance were performed upon the data 
for objective and subjective subjects from each phase of 
the experiment. These analyses are summarized in Table 4, 
which shows that none of the treatments differed from one 
another at any phase of the experiment for either group of 
subjects. The hypothesis was therefore rejected. 
Although the four treatments were shown not to differ 
from one another when compared separately, the data were 
re-combined so that the effects of experimenter approval 
or nonapproval could be demonstrated. Treatments l and 3, 
which included the experimenter's approval of the model's 
responses, were compared with Treatments 2 and 4, which 
did not include such approval. The data were also ana-
lyzed for the effects of the model's explanations. Thus 
the treatments which incorporated explanations (Treatments 
3 and 4) were compared with those which did not (Treat-
ments land 2). Table 5 summarizes the results of this 
analysis for subjective subjects. The only significant 
variable in this analysis was Phases (1:13.02; ~=2.72; 
£<.001) reflecting the fact that significantly different 
numbers of subjective moral responses were given by sub-
jective subjects in the three phases of the experiment. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1. No significance 
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Table 4 
Summary of Analyses of Variance of Subjective 
Moral Judgments by Objective and Subjective Subjects 
in Four Treatments at Each Phase of the Experiment 
!* 
Objective Subjects 
Pretest Phase 1.85 N.S. 
Experimental Phase 0.51 N.S. 
Pos ttea t Phase 2.35 N.S. 
Subjective Subjects 
Pretest Phase l.04 N.S. 
Experimental Phase 0.36 N.S. 
Posttest Phase 1.13 N.S. 
*~ • 3,36 
- 61 -
Table 5 
Analysis of Variance of Subjective Moral Judgments 
for Subjective Subjects 
Source df MS F 
- - -
Total 119 
Between Subjects 39 
Approval/No Approval Treatments l 26.14 2 .18 
Explanation/No Explanation Treatments l 4.04 0.34 
Approval x Explanation l l.18 0.10 
Error Between 36 12.00 
Within Subjects 80 
Phases of Experiment 2 65.10 13.02**** 
Phases x Approval 2 3.13 0.63 
Phases x Explanation 2 7.43 1.49 
Phases x Approval x Explanation 2 0.21 0.04 
Error Within 72 s.oo 
****2. <.001 
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accompanied the variables of Approval or Explanations or 
their interactions. This suggests that, for subjective 
subjects, the decreasing number of subjective judgments 
over the three phases was not due to any particular in-
fluencing technique employed by the model and experi-
menter. The subjective subjects produced fewer subjec-
tive responses when ex.posed to a model who responded in 
an objective fashion, irrespective of the model's expla-
nations or the experimenter's approval. 
The results of a similar analysis for objective 
subjects are presented in Table 6. Again, Phases proved 
to be a highly significant variable (!=44.71; .2!•2,72; 
£<.OOl). Also significant was the interaction between 
the variables of Phases and Explanations (!•4.38; £!c2,72; 
£<.025). For the objective as well as the subjective 
subjects, it made no difference whether the model's re• 
sponses were approved by the experimenter. But the in-
crease in the mean number of subjective responses over the 
three phases of the experiment did depend upon whether the 
model explained her responses. 
To determine the nature of the interaction between 
the Phases and Explanations variables, a further analysis 
of the data from the objective subjects was made by means 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Variance of Subjective Moral Judgments 
for Objective Subjects 
Source 
Total 
Between Subjects 
Approval/No Approval Treatments 
Explanation/No Explanation Treatments 
Approval x Explanation 
Error Between 
Within Subjects 
Phases of Experiment 
Phases x Approval 
Phases x Explanation 
Phases x Approval 
Error Within 
**e. < .025 
****e. < . 001 
x Explanation 
S! MS F 
- -
119 
39 
1 18.41 1.54 
l 16.88 1.41 
1 4.39 0.37 
36 11.97 
80 
2 208.81 44. 71**** 
2 0.91 0.91 
2 20.47 4.38** 
2 4.52 0.97 
72 4.67 
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of s tests. The No-Explanation treatments (Treatments l 
and 2) were compared with the Explanation treatments 
(Treatments 3 and 4) at each phase of the experiment. The 
comparisons are summarized in Table 7, which shows that 
only in the posttest phase did the subjects in the Explana-
tion and No-Explanation groups give significantly different 
mean numbers of subjective responses. Figure 3 illustrates 
that in the posttest phase, objective subjects who had heard 
the model's explanations gave 7.3 subjective responses, 
whereas those to whom the model did not explain her answers 
gave only 4.5 subjective responses in the posttest phase. 
Results Pertaining S2., Sb!, Control Groues 
The present investigation included two control groups. 
The first group of 20 subjects was treated exactly like 
the subjects who were exposed to the experimental treatments 
except that no model was present during the experimental 
phase. Measures were obtained from these control subjects 
at each of the three phases of the experiment. Ten con-
trol subjects were objective on the pretest, ten were sub-
jective. Analyses of variance of the mean number of sub-
jective moral judgments produced by the objective and 
subjective control subjects across the three phases of the 
- 65 -
Table 7 
Comparisons of No-Explanation Treatments (Treatments 1 and 2) 
with Explanation Treatments (Treatments 3 and 4) for Objective 
Subjects at Each Phase of the Experiment 
Pretest Phase 
Experimental Phase 
Posttest Phase 
38 
38 
38 
1.82 
0.60 
2.27 
N.S. 
N.S. 
.05 
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experiment were performed. The values of F were nonsig-
-
nificant for objective control subjects (l • 0.51, 
.2! • 2 ,18, e.> .05) as well as for subjective control sub-
jects (l • 0.60, .2! • 2,18, 2>.0S), indicating that the 
control subjects produced essentially the same number of 
subjective responses at each phase. 
The second control group was also made up of 20 sub-
jects. These children were randomly selected from the 
classrooms which supplied the original 168 subjects for 
the pretest phase of the experiment. Their only contact 
with the moral judtpnent stories was with the posttest, 
administered at the same time as the 100 other subjects. 
It was necessary to compare the moral judgments of 
the posttest control subjects with the judgments made by 
the original 168 subjects since they were all selected at 
random from the same population. The 80 experimental 
subjects and the 20 subjects from the first control group, 
on the other hand, were selected on the basis of their 
scores on the pretest. The mean number of subjective 
moral judtpnents made by the 168 original subjects was 
4.67. The mean number of subjective moral judgments made 
by the 20 postteat control subjects was 5.20. These means 
do not differ significantly (S•0.74; !!,!•186). It can 
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therefore be concluded that the interval of time from pre-
test to posttest did not alone contribute to any changes 
in the moral judgments of the subjects. 
Chapter IV 
Discuesion 
I!!!, Effectiveness 2.! Models !!! Influencing Children's 
Moral Judgments 
The first purpose of the present experiment was to 
demonstrate the fact that children's moral judgments can 
be influenced by exposing them to adult models who advo-
cate opposite moral points of view. This is a fact which 
has been demonstrated in the past by Bandura and McDonald 
(1963), Dworkin (1968), and Cowan et al. (1969). The 
present study gave further support to the findings of 
Bandura and McDonald and Cowan et al. that children's 
moral judgments can be influenced regardless of the moral 
orientations with which they began the experiment. That 
is, objective children can be influenced to make subjective 
moral judgments, and subjective children can be influenced 
toward objectivity. 
The fact that subjective children can be influenced 
toward objectivity might seem to call into question 
Piaget's cognitive development theory of the process by 
which children come to make mature moral judgments. 
Piaget theorized that the primary means by which children 
abandon the objective and adopt the subjective point of 
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view is through increased cooperation with and mutual 
respect for peers (Piaget, 1965). The implication is 
strong in Piaget's theory that children will not reverse 
themselves to adopt an objective viewpoint after they 
have previously attained a subjective attitude. Piaget 
considers the progression from objectivity to subjectivity 
to be in a natural direction, its speed determined prima-
rily by the length of time it takes a child to become 
relatively free from adult constraint. Because adults 
must impose a system of rules for living upon children 
before they are capable of understanding the reasons be-
hind the rules, adults fall into the habit of issuing 
instructions without furnishing a rationale and children 
unilaterally respect such rules without questioning why 
they were given. His theory further assumes that when a 
child begins to interact with other children on a recip-
rocal basis, judgments about the good and right of action 
begin to be made on the basis of the agent's intentions 
rather than according to a set of arbitrary rules. Piaget 
has even suggested that the process of attaining the sub-
jective moral viewpoint could be speeded by placing chil-
dren in communal situations like nursery schools or kib-
butzim at an earlier age than is now customary (Hall, 1970). 
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When children make moral judgments on a subjective basis, 
according to Piaget, they ere no longer liable to the 
objectivity which characterized their earlier judgments. 
The present study, however, has demonstrated that objec-
tive moral judgments can be elicited from subjective 
children who are exposed to an adult model who makes 
judgments on an objective basis. 
There are some possible explanations for this apparent 
violation of Piaget's cognitive development theory of moral 
judgment. It has been argued by Turiel (1966), in dis• 
cussing similar results reported by Bandura and McDonald 
(1963), that only superficial verbal responses were af-
fected by the training through model exposure and that the 
underlying cognitive structures which are basic to Piaget's 
theory were not really affected. Turiel based his argument 
primarily on the fact that the posttest in the Bandura and 
McDonald study followed illll1l8diately after the experimental 
training procedure. Since that argument was proposed, 
however, Cowan et al. (1969) and the present investigation 
have shown relatively long-lasting effects of the modeling 
procedure upon the moral judgments of subjective children. 
Another explanation for the present findings may be 
found in the argument by Cowan et al. that their results 
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did not vitiate the Piagetian stage theory because the 
experimental task itself was not an appropriate measure 
of children's moral judpents. They suggested that the 
restrictions of their experimental procedure prevented 
them from adequately testing Piaget's theory by incorpo-
rating his own clinical interview technique. The present 
investigation included an experimental procedure similar 
to that used by Cowan et al. Bandura (1969b) has pointed 
out, however, that the interview technique employed by 
Piaget actually included a form of symbolic modeling as a 
means of testing the firmness with which a moral attitude 
was held by a child. For example, Piaget often suggested 
to children he interviewed that other children would feel 
differently about the story he told them, and asked how 
they could justify their responses in light of that knowl-
edge. Such a technique constitutes symbolic modeling and 
is thus somewhat comparable to the experimental procedure 
in the Cowan et al. study and in the present investigation. 
It would appear that a strict interpretation of 
Piaget's cognitive development theory of moral judgment 
does not apply to the results of the present study because 
of the demonstration that subjective children can be 
influenced by adult models to alter their moral judgments 
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toward objectivity and that this modification persists 
after a period of three weeks even though the model is no 
longer present. Bandura's social learning theory is a 
good alternate explanation for the present demonstration 
that children who were of a mature moral attitude could 
be influenced by a model to make immature moral judgments. 
Bandura 's theory holds that simply observing a model who 
consistently advocates a particular point of view is often 
sufficient to bring about a change in the observer's 
attitude (Baldwin, 1967). 
Inspection of Figure 2 suggests that objective sub-
jects in the present study may have been influenced toward 
subjectivity to a greater extent than subjective subjects 
were influenced toward objectivity. This observation can 
be accounted for in Bandura's social learning theory by 
noting the probability that children of a subjective moral 
orientation have a different history of reinforcement than 
children of an objective moral orientation. In a recent 
article Bandura (1969b) has suggested that an important 
factor in a child's switch from an objective to a subjec-
tive moral orientation is the social reward he obtains from 
his parents for doing so. Bandura theorized that when 
parents feel a child is capable of taking into account the 
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intentions of someone who does something wrong, they begin 
to reward the child whenever he does and the child thereby 
learns a new mode of thinking. Such children would have a 
much different reinforcement history than children who 
continued to make objective moral judgments and had seldom 
or never been rewarded for making subjective judgments. 
The objective and subjective subjects in the present study 
may have had very different reinforcement histories, and 
this may account for the result that objective subjects 
were more influenced toward subjectivity than subjective 
subjects were influenced toward objectivity. If the sub-
jective subjects had a history of being rewarded for sub-
jective moral judgments, that history would work against 
their being influenced by a model who advocated the objec-
tive point of view. The objective subjects, on the other 
hand, may not have a history of strong reinforcement for 
the objective viewpoint (since adults do judge acts in 
terms of intentionality) and this may account in part for 
the fact that they were more easily influenced by the 
model. 
!!!!, Effects 2! Different Treat:lnents Upon Children's 
Moral Judgments 
The present study incorporated three influencing 
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techniques in four experimental treatments. In all treat-
ments, an adult female model made moral judgments in a 
manner contrary to that of the subject, as determined by 
the pretest. Experimenter approval and explanations by 
the model were used in some of the treatments. 
For objective subjects as well as subjective subjects, 
comparisons of the four treatments used in the present 
study revealed no differences among the treatments at any 
phase of the experiment. No one treatment influenced 
children to alter their moral orientations more than any 
other treatment. Apparently all four treatments resulted 
in a similar degree of change in the subjects' moral 
judgments. Thus the hypothesis that the treatments would 
produce different amounts of change in the moral judgments 
of the children was rejected. Even when the effects of 
the treatments were combined so that those treatments 
which included the experimenter's approval of the model's 
responses could be compared with those treatments which 
did not, no differences were found at any phase of the 
experiment. This is consistent with the findings of 
Bandura and McDonald (1963), who reported that approval 
alone produced no changes in the subjects' responses. 
Dworkin (1968) also found that approval by the experimenter 
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resulted in little change in his subjects' moral orienta-
tions. It may be that children will alter their moral 
judgments if they are rewarded for doing so, but approval 
by the experimenter is apparently not the sort of rein-
forcement which will bring about such a change. More 
tangible rewards or approval by an important adult such as 
a teacher or parent might result in a significant change 
in children's moral judgments. 
Differences among the treatments were found when they 
were compared on the basis of whether or not they included 
explanations by the model. When all four treatments were 
compared individually with one another these differences 
were obscured. But for the objective subjects, the treat-
ments which included the model's explanations resulted in 
a greater number of subjective moral judgments at the post-
test phase of the experiment than those treatments which 
did not include such explanations. For subjective subjects, 
however, there was no difference at any phase of the ex-
periment between the treatments which included explanations 
and the treatments which did not. 
Children who were subjective at the beginning of the 
experiment, then, were not swayed from that point of view 
either by rewards or by logic. This fits in with Piaget's 
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theory which holds that children who have attained a 
mature, subjective, 1110ral point of view recognize the 
logic of that view and will not be persuaded from it. 
Taken as a whole, however, subjective children did signif-
icantly change their moral judgments as the experiment 
progressed through its three phases. This change was not 
due to any single kind of treatment. Nor was it due to 
the fact that the experimenter sometimes approved the mod-
el 'a responses. Whether the model explained her responses 
was not a factor. Apparently the simple fact of being 
exposed to an adult model who made objective, or immature, 
moral judgments was sufficient to bring about a significant 
change toward objectivity in the moral judgments of sub-
jective children. 
The results reported for the subjective children were 
probably due to what Bandura (l969a) bas referred to as 
the response facilitation effect of observing a model. 
That is, the general class of objective judgments was made 
more likely to occur by presenting an adult model who made 
such judgments. In this case, no new learning took place, 
since all children who reached a subjective moral point of 
view are preswned to have already passed through the ob-
jective stage of moral reasoning. The children learned 
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that the experimental situation was an appropriate place 
to make moral judgments of an in:mature nature. Turiel 
(1966) has argued that the essential cognitive structures 
which facilitate mature, or subjective, moral judgments 
are not really affected by the influencing techniques used 
in the present experiment. This contention has received 
support from the demonstration that the model's explana-
tions, which were directed at the subjects' logical 
thinking, did not result in an increased number of objec-
tive judgments among subjective subjects. Although the 
subjective subjects were influenced by the model to make 
objective judgments, her explanations for doing so were 
not convincing. 
Subjects who began the experiment with an objective 
moral orientation also altered their responses to a sig-
nificant degree as the experiment proceeded through its 
three phases. They began the experiment making almost 
entirely objective moral judgments, but produced more and 
more subjective jud~~ents during the experimental and 
posttest phases. As in the case of the subjective sub-
jects, it made no difference whether the model's responses 
were approved by the experimenter. The same amount of 
change in the subjects' responses occurred regardless of 
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the experimenter's approval or lack of it. 
In contrast to the results obtained with the subjec-
tive subjects, however, the degree to which objective 
children changed their responses toward subjectivity did 
depend upon whether the model gave explanations for her 
responses. In the posttest phase of the experiment, ob-
jective children who bad beard the model explain her re-
sponses produced a significantly greater number of subjec-
tive responses than objective children who did not bear 
such explanation. For subjects who began the experiment 
with a subjective moral orientation, however, it made no 
difference whether the model explained her responses. 
The simple modeling effect which was found to operate 
in the case of the subjective subjecta was also present as 
far as the objective subjects were concerned. This can be 
seen by the fact that objective children produced a greater 
number of subjective responses in each succeeding phase of 
the experiment, at all times irrespective of the experi-
menter's approval, and in the experimental phase irrespec-
tive of the model's explanations. The children learned to 
make a new kind of judgment simply by being exposed to a 
model who did so. But the modeling effect was not the 
only significant variable which operated in the case of 
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objective subjects. The model's explanations resulted in 
an even greater number of subjective responses in the 
posttest phase of the experiment. 
It is likely that the model's explanations presented 
the objective children with information which allowed them 
to adopt the subjective point of view. In this context it 
is apparent that Piaget was correct in his observation 
that by purely cognitive or rational means it is possible 
to teach formerly objective children the concept of sub-
jectivity but that it is not possible to reverse a child's 
judgment from the objective to the subjective frame of 
reference. That is, logical explanations only work if 
they are oriented toward increasingly mature judgments, 
but not if they are aimed at influencing children to make 
less mature moral judgments. 
The modeling effect has been shown in the present · 
study to be a powerful one for altering the moral judgments 
of both objective and subjective children. This supports 
Bandura's social learning theory of the means by which 
children learn to make such judgments. In addition, 
Piaget's observation that the judgments of subjective 
children cannot be influenced toward objectivity by the 
use of logical persuasion was also confirmed. 
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Ih!. §!.! g,! .£!l!. Subjects !!. ! Variable !!!. Children's 
Moral Judgments 
The results of the present experiment showed the sex 
of the children did not influence their susceptibility to 
the influence of a female model who advocated alternative 
moral points of view. Boys and girls proved to be equally 
susceptible to the various treatments used in the present 
study. 
Implications £2.!. Influencing Children's Moral JudHtUents 
Dworkin's conclusion that a training technique which 
stresses the communication of cognitive information by a 
model promotes effective and long lasting learning 
(Dworkin, 1968, p. 89) has been supported by the results 
of the present study. This is true only in the case of 
children who have not yet obtained the subjective ~iewpoint 
in moral reasoning, however. 
It is unlikely that in any real life setting an at-
tempt would be made to influence subjective children to 
respond in an objective fashion. Such an attempt 'WOuld 
be contrary to the direction of accepted socialization. 
In order to test the implications of the cognitive devel-
opment and social learning theories of moral development, 
however, the present investigation did include an attempt 
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to influence subjective children toward objectivity. It 
was felt that such an attempt did not pose any long-term 
threat to the normal socialization of the children involved 
because their exposure to the experimental manipulation 
was very slight compared with the influences of parents, 
teachers, and many peers toward subjectivity to which they 
were exposed daily. To insure that the effects of the 
experiment did not continue beyond the posttest, all sub-
jects were debriefed at the conclusion of the experiment. 
While it is unlikely for subjective children to be 
trained toward objectivity, the opposite approach of 
training objective children toward subjectivity is a 
common goal of the American socialization agencies of 
home, school, and church. The influencing technique in 
the present investigation which incorporated the model's 
explanations was similar to the "inductivett parental 
disciplining procedure described by Hoffman and Saltztein 
(1967}. These investigators found that seventh grade 
children de~eloped mature moral attitudes, as revealed in 
Piaget-type moral judgment stories, most rapidly when 
their parents employed the tactic of disciplining their 
children inductively. That is, these parents pointed out 
to their children the negative or even painful consequences 
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of the children's misdeeds for the parents or for others. 
Other disciplinary measures such as withdrawal of love, 
physical punishment, or material deprivation did not 
result in as rapid adoption of a subjective moral attitude. 
In fact, the least effective method of instilling subjec-
tivity in children was the use of physical punishment. 
I!!! Relationship Between Moral Judgment !.!!!! Moral Behavior 
The present study has focused on children's moral 
judgments. It is not to be construed from the results that 
moral behavior necessarily stems from subjectivity in moral 
attitude. Rather, mature moral attitude as defined by the 
experimental task refers primarily to maturity in a form 
of logical thinking. 
Hartshorne and May (1928), Havighurst and Taba (1949), 
Hoffman (1963), and many others have demonstrated that 
children who e~e able to make mature moral descisions are 
nonetheless susceptible to temptation or can react more 
out of passion than logical thinking. Apparently the 
judgment of external, fairly abstract situations is quite 
different from reacting personally in a similar situation. 
The results of the present study have shown that 
models can be used to influence children's moral judgments, 
particularly if the modeling situation includes cognitive 
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information in the form of the model's explanations for 
her responses. A rele~ant area for future research might 
be the application of such influencing techniques to 
actual behavior in moral situations. Grinder (1962), for 
example, has shown that observation of models can influence 
a child's resistance to temptation. The addition of other 
technique~ to a paradigm like his might suggest some 
effective ways of training mature moral behavior. 
Chapter V 
Summary 
Three influencing techniques were used to elicit 
objective, or immature, moral judgments from children who 
were shown to be subjective, or mature, on a pretest. The 
same techniques were used to elicit subjective moral judg-
ments from objective children. The techniques were model-
ing, experimenter approval of the model's responses, and 
explanations of her responses by the model. The techniques 
were incorporated into four treatments which included mod-
eling alone, modeling plua approval, modeling plus explan-
ations, and modeling plus approval plus explanations. 
Ten moral judgment stories of the kind originated by 
Piaget were read to 168 elementary school children to 
determine their moral orientationa. Each story described 
a well intentioned or accidental act which resulted in a 
great deal of material damage, contrasted with a selfishly 
motivated act which resulted in very little damage. One 
hundred boys and girls, aged 6-4 to 10-2, were selected as 
subjects. Half the children were decidedly objective in 
their responses to the pretest, and half were decidedly 
subjective. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of 
the four treatment groups or to a control group. 
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During the experimental phase of the study the exper-
imenter read moral judgment stories alternately to an 
adult female model and the individual subjects. The model 
responded in a fashion opposite that of the subject's 
orientation as measured by the pretest. In some cases her 
responses were approved by the experimenter. In some 
cases she explained the rationale for her responses. Sub-
jects in the control group beard the same stories but were 
not exposed to a model, experimenter approval, or explana-
tions of any sort. Three weeks after the experimental 
phase all subjects were asked to respond to another set of 
moral judgment stories as a postteat. Twenty additional 
subjects who were selected at random from the original 
population as an additional control group also responded 
to the posttest. 
The results showed that objective and subjective sub-
jects were significantly influenced by modeling to adopt 
the alternate moral viewpoint. Objective children were 
more influenced toward subjectivity than subjective chil-
dren were influenced toward objectivity. The most effec-
tive influencing technique was modeling alone. At no time 
did the experimenter's approval increase the degree to 
which the subjects were influenced to change. When the 
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model explained her responses, objective children adopted 
the subjective orientation more readily than when she did 
not. For subjective children, however, the model's expla-
nations did not result in a greater number of objective 
responses. The sex of the subjects was found to be of no 
consequence in terms of their susceptibility to the 
influencing techniques. 
The results were discussed in terms of their rele-
vance to Bandura•s social learning theory and Piaget's 
cognitive development theory. The powerful modeling ef-
fect was interpreted as lending support to Bandura's in-
terpretation of moral development. Piaget's theory was 
supported by the demonstration that the model's explana-
tions were effective only in influencing children in the 
direction of increasing subjectivity. Further research 
was suggested to clarify the relationship of moral judg-
ment to moral behavior. 
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APPENDIX A 
Stories Used in the Pretest Phase 
Story 1: 
One day Jane took her mother•s scissors when her mother was 
out. She played with them for awhile on her bed. But Jane 
didn't know how to use the scissors very well and she cut a 
little hole in the blanket. 
Mary wanted to make her mother a nice surprise picture. 
Mary was cutting a picture on her bed. But Mary didn't 
know how to use the scissors very well and she cut a big 
hole in the blanket. 
Story 2: 
One day Oscar's father was pulling weeds from the flower 
garden. Oscar liked to help his father so Oscar asked if 
he could pull some weeds too. His father was very happy 
that Oscar wanted to help him. Oscar worked real hard. 
But Oscar didn't know what the flower plants looked like 
and he pulled out almost all of the flower plants as well 
as the weeds. 
Bill went over to his friend's house and asked him if he 
could borrow his football for a little while. His friend 
said no, he didn't lend his football to anybody. So Bill 
walked away. As Bill passed a flower that his friend was 
growing in a flowerpot, Bill pulled a leaf off the flower. 
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Story 3: 
Denny and his friends had just eaten lunch. They went for 
a walk and passed by some apple trees that belonged to a 
man that Denny didn't like. Denny climbed over the fence 
and took one apple. 
Jimmy and his friends went on a hike one day. Jimmy came 
from a poor home and he did not have very much food for 
breakfast that morning. On the hike they passed by some 
apple trees. Jimmy climbed over the fence and picked ten 
apples off a tree. He ate some and took some home for his 
brothers and sisters. 
Story 4: 
Jane came in from playing outside. She felt real tired so 
her mother told her to take a rest. Jane didn't know that 
her mother left her bat on the sofa. Jane walked over to 
the sofa and plopped down. When Jane laid down she 
squashed her mother's hat all out of shape. 
One day Doris' mother and father went visiting and Doris 
was alone at home. She wanted to see the things in the 
top of her parents' closet. 
not be home till auppertime. 
Doris knew her parents would 
So Doris climbed up on a 
chair, but aa she was reaching for the thing• in the closet 
the mother's hat box fell down and the hat got bent a 
little bit. 
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Story 5: 
Chuck didn't care much for fingerpainting. When the class 
was fingerpainting one afternoon Chuck didn't do much 
fingerpainting. Chuck just played with the paint and 
dribbled a little on his desk. 
One day the teacher asked "Who would like to help clean up 
the paints?" Len said "I will, Mias Brown." Len wanted 
to help so much that he tried to carry six paint jars to 
the sink. But they slipped out of his handa and paint 
spilled all over the floor. 
Story 6: 
Barbara decided that she would clean up her room and put 
her toys away so that her mother would not have so much 
work to do. Barbara put her big doll in the toybox and 
then she put the wooden blocks in too. Barbara did not 
think that the blocks would hurt the doll. But when Bar-
bara put the blocks in the toybox they fell on the pretty 
doll and broke it all to pieces. 
Amy wanted to watch television but her mother said that 
it was time to clean up and go to bed. Amy didn't like 
that because she could not watch her favorite program. 
When her mother left the room Amy picked up a doll and 
threw it on the floor. When the doll hit the floor, one 
of the doll's finger• broke off. 
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Story 7: 
Erma's sister was looking at pictures in a magazine. Erma 
wanted to look at the magazine too. So Erma waited for a 
while and then told her sister that she wanted it now. Her 
sister aaid that she wasn't finished looking at it yet. 
Erma tried to take the magazine from her sister and as she 
did one of the pages tore. 
One day Hazel decided to make a pretty picture for her sis-
ter. Hazel went to the living room and picked out a maga• 
zine and cut out all the colored pictures. Hazel did not 
know that the magazine that she had cut to pieces was a 
new magaaine that someone bad put on the pile of old maga-
zines by mistake. So Hazel's mommy and daddy bad no new 
magazine to read all that week. 
Story 8: 
Gary and his friends were building a boat out of wood. 
Gary cut the pieces of -wood and the other boys put the 
pieces together. They were just about finished building 
when the other boys had to go home. Gary said, "I'll 
finish the boat so we can play with it when you come 
back." Gary was busy cutting the last piece but he didn't 
know that the boat was under the board and be cut the boat 
to pieces. 
Once some boys were building an airplane on the school 
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grounds. They were almost finished putting the airplane 
together when the schoolbell rang and they bad to go back 
in the classroom. Roger was the last boy to go back in. 
As Roger ran past the airplane he noticed that no one was 
watching so he decided to fly it. Roger tossed it in the 
air but when it landed the tip of the tail broke off. 
Story 9: 
One day when Peter's father had gone to work Peter thought 
it would be fun to play with his father's fountain pen. 
First Peter played with the pen and then he made a little 
blot on the tablecloth. 
One day when John's father was away Johnny noticed that 
his father'• fountain pen was empty. Johnny thought he 
would help his father by filling the pen with ink so that 
the pen would be ready when his father needed it. But 
while Johnny was opening the ink bottle, he made a big 
blot on the tablecloth. 
Story 10: 
One afternoon Jill decided to take a walk to the play-
ground. Her mother thought that it might rain and she 
called after Jill to take her raincoat. But Jill didn't 
hear her mother. It did rain and Jill's new dress got 
so wet that it shrank and she couldn't wear it any more. 
One day Alice was going out to play. Her mother told her 
- 99 -
to take an umbrella because it might start to rain. But 
Alice didn't want to carry the umbrella so she left it at 
home. It did rain and Alice's dress got a little wet and 
had to be cleaned. 
APPENDIX B 
Stories Used For The Children 
In the Experimental Phase 
Story 1: 
One day Floyd's father was painting the fence. Floyd asked 
h~ father if he could help. His father said sure. So 
Floyd got a brush and started painting. After Floyd paint-
ed for a while be stepped back to see bow it looked. But 
Floyd forgot that the paint can was right behind him. His 
foot knocked over the paint can and all the paint spilled 
on the ground. 
Paul came out to watch his father paint the barbecue table. 
His father told Paul not to bother him. Paul didn't like 
that. So when bis father went to the garage to get the 
brushes. Paul took the paint stick and dribbled a little 
paint on the ground. 
Story 2: 
Joyce was playing with her younger sister one day. Soon 
Joyce got tired of playing but her younger sister wanted 
to keep on playing. So Joyce hid her little sister's 
doll so that they'd have to stop playing. 
Sally was trying to teach her little brother a game. They 
were having lots of fun throwing a ball around. But once 
Sally threw the ball too far and a car ran over it and 
smashed the ball to pieces. 
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Story 3: 
Mark was hurrying to get to school one day so he wouldn't 
be late. Mark ran so fast that he dropped his schoolbooks 
in a mudpuddle and they got full of .nud. 
Jimmy's mother just finished reading him a story and then 
it was tuae to go to bed. Jimmy didn't want to go to bed 
so he spilled milk on one of the pages of the book. 
Story 4: 
Kate was getting tired of waiting while her mother was 
shopping. So Kate ran up and down the aisles in the gro-
cery store. The clerk told Kate to slow down and be more 
careful. But Kate was having a good time and she didn't 
pay any attention. She started to run again when he wasn't 
looking. As Kate turned the corner her hand hit a box of 
kleenex and it fell on the floor. 
Pam went grocery shopping with her mother one day. They 
were almost finished shopping when her mother remembered 
that she needed a bottle of ketchup which was at the back 
of the store. Pam said• "I' 11 get it for you, mother." 
As Pam was taking the bottle off the shelf, she didn't 
lift the bottle high enough. Three bottles fell off the 
shelf and broke and the ketchup spilled all over the floor. 
Story 5: 
Fred was playing football one day. His team was losing 
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the game. If Fred could score then his team would win the 
game. Fred tried real hard to score, and he was running 
real fast. But he bumped into Tommy, a player on the other 
team, and he broke Tommy's nose. 
Jimmy wanted to play football with some of the bigger boys 
but they said he was too si:nall and he might get hurt. 
Jimmy didn't like that, so he stuck his foot out and one 
of the boys who was running with the ball fell over Jimmy's 
foot, and got a tiny scratch. 
Story 6: 
Hazel's older sister was putting a puzzle together, and 
Hazel wanted to work on it too. But her older sister 
wouldn't let her and said to Hazel, "No, it's my puzzle, 
not yours." So Hazel watched her sister for a while. When 
her sister bent down to pick up a piece that fell on the 
floor, Hazel took one piece from the puzzle and hid it in 
her pocket. 
Barbara was cleaning up her sister's room. Her sister had 
finished part of a puzzle and had put the rest of the 
pieces in an old paper bag on the floor. Barbara thought 
that the bag was empty so she picked it up and threw it in 
the garbage. When Barbara's sister came to finish the puz-
zle she couldn't do it because most of the pieces were gone. 
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Story 7: 
David's mother said that he was old enough to pour his own 
milk at the dinner table. One day at dinner David was 
pouring himself s glass of milk. But the milkbottle slip-
ped from his hands and there was milk and broken glass all 
over the table. 
One day at breakfast Billy finished drinking his orange 
juice before his brother. Billy decided to take a drink 
of his brother's glass when his brother wasn't looking. 
But when he did a little orange juice spilled on the table. 
Story 8: 
Sharon's mother was making dinner one day. While her 
mother was getting the meat ready for the oven, Sharon 
decided to turn the dial on the oven lower than it was 
supposed to be. So the family had to wait an extra half 
hour for dinner that night. 
One day Margaret was helping her mother make dinner. Her 
mother asked Margaret to turn the oven dial to 300 degrees. 
But Margeret turned it to 400 degrees by mistake. When it 
was time to be done the whole dinner was ruined. 
Story 9: 
Joe and his father went to the shopping center in theil. 
car. As they were getting out of the car, his father 
asked Joe to lock the car door. But Joe didn't hear his 
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father , and so he just closed the door without locking 
it. While they were in the store, somebody took a very 
expensive camera out of the car. 
Bill was playing on the front lawn. His father called 
Bill for supper, and told Bill to bring his baseball in 
with him. But Bill wanted to play with his ball after 
supper, and so he just left the ball on the front lawn. 
While Bill was eating supper, somebody came along and took 
the ball. 
Story 10: 
Norma was looking at the pictures that the family took 
while they were on their vacation. While Norma was looking 
at the pictures she noticed that her brother was in moat of 
the pictures. So when Norma came to another picture with 
her brother in it, she got a crayon and made a little mark 
on the picture. 
Alice and her siater were looking at the pictures of the 
family. They were laughing at some of the pictures taken 
of them when they were little. As Alice started to point 
to one of these pictures, her hand bumped into a glass of 
milk. The milk spilled on the album and ruined about 20 
pictures. 
APPENDIX C 
Stories and Answers Used For the Model 
In the Experimental Phase 
Story l: 
Tony's friend was building a tower with blocks. Tony 
liked to help, and so when he saw his friend building the 
tower, Tony helped his friend by bringing the blocks to 
him. But as Tony got up, he tripped and fell against the 
tower, and the whole tower crashed down. 
Harry asked one of the boys to play store with him. But 
the boy said, ''No, I'm going to build a tower out of 
blocks." When the boy wasn't looking, Harry walked over 
and knocked one block off the tower. 
Subjective Response: ''Well, Tony was trying to help his 
friend and he didn't mean to knock the tower down -- it 
was just an accident. But Harry knocked the block off on 
purpose -- he really meant to do it." 
Objective Response: ''Harry only knocked one little block 
off a whole tower, but Tony knocked the whole tower down. 
So I think Tony is naughtier because he knocked all the 
blocks down and Harry only knocked one down." 
Story 2: 
Mabel was helping her mother vacuum the playroom. As 
Mabel was pushing the vacuum back and forth, the vacuum 
bumped against the leg of a table. A bunch of records 
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fell off the table and 10 of them broke. 
Rose's older sister played her record player a lot. One 
day Rose's sister kept playing the same record over and 
over again. Rose got tired of hearing this record. So 
Rose took the record and hid it for a couple of days so 
her sister couldn't play the record. 
Subjective Response: ''Mabel didn't really mean to break 
the records -- it was just an accident. But Rose hid the 
record on purpose, so I think she was the naughtier one." 
Objective Response: "Kabel broke 10 records, but Rose 
only hid one. So Mabel was naughtier, because she broke 
records and Rose didn't break any ... 
Story 3: 
One day Sam's friend threw a bag of water at him. That 
afternoon Sam saw his friend coming home from school. Sam 
hid behind a fence and as the boy passed by, Sam squirted 
him in the leg with a water pistol. 
One afternoon Jack was watering the lawn for his father. 
One of his friends was passing by on the street and called 
out to Jack. While Jack was looking at his friend, the 
hose squirted water all over the seats of a neighbor's car. 
Subjective Response: ''Well, Jack was helping his father 
water the lawn and he didn't mean to squirt water on the 
neighbor's car. But Sam squirted the boy on purpose -- he 
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really meant to do it." 
Objective Response: ttsam just got his friend a little bit 
w-et, but Jack got water all over the seats of somebody's 
else's car. Jack did more damage, so he was naughtier." 
Story 4: 
One morning Alice came in from the yard and found that her 
mother was not back from the store yet. Alice thought she 
would get some ice cream for herself. So she got a little 
cup from the cupboard. As Alice was going to the refrig-
ere tor, the cup dropped and broke. 
Kathie's mother was late coming home from shopping. Kathie 
thought she would like to help her mother so she began to 
set the table for supper. As Kathie was carrying the 
dishes to the table, three large dishes slipped out of her 
hands and broke. 
Subjective Response: "Alice didn't have permission to get 
the ice cream. Kathie was trying to do something nice for 
her mother. She didn't mean to break the dishes ·- it was 
just an accident." 
Objective Response: "Alice only broke one cup, but Kathie 
broke three big dishes. Kathie broke more than Alice did, 
and that's a naughtier thing." 
Story 5: 
Two first grade classes were playing a game to see which 
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class could kick the ball the farthest. All the children 
had had a turn except for Ross. So far his class waa 
losing. But if Rose could kick the ball real far then his 
class would win. Ross took careful aim and kicked the 
ball with all hie might. The ball went sailing across the 
playground and smacked into a window and smashed it to 
pieces. 
Harvey and his class were playing kickball when the school-
bell rang. The teacher said, "Recess is over, let's go 
back to the classroom." Harvey didn't have a turn at 
kicking the ball. So when the teacher was lining up the 
children, Harvey kicked the ball to the other corner of 
the playground and someone else had to go and get it. 
Subjective Response: "Ross was just trying to win the 
game, he didn't mean to break the window -- it was just 
an accident. But Harvey kicked the ball on purpose just 
because he didn't have a turn." 
Objective Response: "Ross broke a window, and Harvey 
didn't break anything. Harvey just kicked the ball a 
little ways, but Ross broke a window." 
Story 6: 
Lynn asked her teacher if she could take three reading 
books home. The teacher said yes she could. That day it 
was raining so Lynn's mother drove her home from school. 
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As Lynn was getting out of the car, the three reading 
books fell out of her bands and dropped in a mudpuddle 
and got all full of mud. 
Diana and her older sister were watching T.V. But the 
older sister wanted to watch another program. The older 
sister just turned the T.V. to a different station. Diana 
said, "O.K. I'm not going to watch T .v. with you." So 
while her older sister was watching T. V. Diana went and 
made a si.nall mark with a crayon in her sister's old 
coloring book. 
Subjective Response: "Lynn didn't mean to get her book 
full of mud -- it was just an accident. But Diana went 
and made a mark in her sister's old coloring book just 
because her sister wanted to watch a different T.V. pro-
gram. She did that on purpose." 
Objective Response: ''Diana just made one little mark, 
and it was in an old book anyway. But Lynn got mad all 
over three books from the school, and that was a naughty 
thing to do." 
Story 7: 
John was sitting at the supper table and be had eaten all 
his food except for his potatoes. John told his mother 
that he did not want to eat his potatoes. His mother said 
that John ha<l to eat his potatoes or he would not get any 
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dessert. When his mother and father were busy talking and 
not looking, John pushed his plate and it knocked over the 
salt shaker and a little salt spilt on the table. 
Peter and his parents were sitting down having supper. The 
mother needed some sugar which was next to Peter's plate. 
Peter told his mother that he 'WOuld pass the sugar to her. 
As Peter reached for the sugar bowl, his hand hit a bottle 
of milk and the milk spilt all over the table. 
Subjective Response: "Well Peter was just trying to pass 
his mother the sugar and he didn't mean to spill the milk 
-- it was just an accident. But John pushed his plate on 
purpose just because he had to eat his potatoes." 
Objective Response: ''Well John only spilled some salt, 
and that can be cleaned up very easily. But Peter spilled 
milk all over the table and made a big mess. He was 
naughtier because he spilled more." 
Story 8: 
Leslie's mommy just finished baking a cake for dessert one 
night. But Leslie was very hungry and she didn't want to 
wait until after dinner. So when her mommy went into the 
living room, Leslie licked a little frosting from the cake. 
Joy asked if she could help her 010mmy with the baking one 
day. Her 010ther said that would be O.K. So Joy and her 
mommy worked all day baking a cake. Joy was carrying the 
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cake over to the table but she slipped on the floor. The 
cake fell to the floor and the family had no dessert that 
night. 
Subjective Response: "Joy was helping her mommy and she 
accidentally dropped the cake. She didn't mean to do it. 
But Leslie didn't ask if she could lick the frosting and 
she did it on purpose." 
Objective Response: "Leslie only licked a little bit of 
frosting off the cake, but Joy ruined the cake so nobody 
could have any dessert. Leslie didn't do very much, but 
Joy dropped a whole cake, and that's naughtier." 
Story 9: 
One day when Fred came back from school he noticed that a 
large board on the fence was loose. He decided to hammer 
the board back to the fence before his dog saw the hole. 
So he got some nails but they were too big. As Fred was 
hammering in the nails they split the board to pieces. 
The next day Fred's father had to buy a large board and 
had to spend Saturday morning fixing the fence. 
Irving and his friends found an old piece of lumber that 
Irving's father had thrown away. So they decided to build 
a small box with it. Irving wanted to saw the pieces but 
his friends didn't want him to. Irving didn't like that ao 
he puabed the board. It fell on the ground and a little 
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piece broke off the end of the board. 
Subjective Response: "Fred was just trying to help and he 
didn't mean to split the board -- it was just an accident. 
But Irving pushed the board on purpose. He really meant 
to do that just 'cause the boys didn't want him to saw." 
Objecti'l'e Response: "Fred broke a board and his father 
had to spend a whole Saturday morning fixing a new one. 
But Irving just broke a small piece off the end of an old 
board which had been thrown away. So Fred did more 
damage." 
Story 10: 
Mary thought it would be nice to clean her father's glasses 
before he came home from work. But while Mary was cleaning 
them, they slipped from her hands and broke into a hundred 
pieces. 
Barbara wanted to play with her mommy's jewelry one day. 
So she went into her mommy's bedroom and started to play. 
But while Barbara was playing a small earring broke and her 
mommy had to take it to the store to be fixed. 
Subjective Response: ''Mary was trying to do something nice 
for her father -- she accidentally dropped the glasses. 
She didn't mean to break them. But Barbara was playing 
with her mommy's jewelry without permission." 
Objectiv-e Response: "Barbara just broke a small earring 
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that could be fixed. But Mary broke her father's glasses, 
and those can't be fixed. Her father had to get new 
glasses. Mary was naughtier because she broke something 
more important." 
APPENDIX D 
Stories Used in the Poattest Phase 
Story 1: 
John was in bis room when bis mother called him down to 
dinner. John went down and opened the door to the dining 
room. But behind the door was a chair and on the chair 
was a tray with 15 cups on it. John did not know that the 
cups were behind the door. John opened the door, the door 
hit the tray, bang went the 15 cups, and they all got 
broken. 
One day when Henry's mother was out Henry tried to get 
some cookies out of the cupboard. Henry climbed up on a 
chair but the cookie jar was still too high, and be 
couldn't reach it. While Henry was trying to reach the 
cookie jar, be knocked over a cup and it fell and broke. 
Story 2: 
The teacher told the children to work at their desks while 
she went to the principal'• office. While the teacher was 
out Jenny got up and went to the board. While Jenny was 
writing on the board she broke a piece of chalk. 
Susie had finished her work in class one day. The teacher 
bad asked the children to take care of the flowers. Susie 
noticed that no one took care of the flowers that day. 
She went to the sink and got a pitcher of water. As Susie 
was pouring the water into the flower vase the water poured 
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out too fast and knocked the vase over. It fell to the 
floor and smashed to pieces. 
Story 3: 
Ned and his friends were building a treehouse. The boys 
were passing the boards to Ned who was up in the treehouse. 
Ned bad helped a lot and they were almost finished. A boy 
handed Ned a big board for the roof. But when Ned was 
lifting the board it dropped out of his hand and fell 
against the side of the treehouse, and the whole treehouse 
crashed to the ground. 
Once some boys were building a treehouse but they wouldn't 
let Jim help. They were planning to finish it after lunch. 
Jim walked by the treehouse wben the boys were away to 
lunch. Jim climbed up in the treehouse and looked around. 
He noticed that no one was there so he knocked off a small 
board from the side of the treehouae. 
Story 4: 
Barbara wanted to buy some candy but she didn't have any 
money. So Barbara took a penny from the kitchen drawer 
and went to the store to buy herself a little piece of 
candy. 
Kathie's mother asked her to go to the store and get some 
groceries. She gave Ka tbie a whole dollar to get the 
groceries with. But on the way to the store the dollar 
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fell through a hole in Kathie's pocket and got lost. 
Story 5: 
Randy went to the school library to get a book for his 
teacher. When Randy opened the door to the library a girl 
was passing by with jars of fingerpaint. Randy did not 
know that the girl was behind the door. The door hit her 
arm, the jars fell out of her hands, and the fingerpaint 
spilled all over the floor. 
Clark was tickling one of the boys during their reading 
lesson. The boy turned around and Clark jerked his hand 
back. Clark's elbow hit a small jar of water. It tipped 
over and a little water spilled on the desk. 
Story 6: 
Margaret came home from school one day and saw her little 
sister eating a cookie. Margaret asked if she could have 
a bite. But her little sister said no. So Margaret went 
into her little sister's room and took a piece of candy 
from her drawer. 
Susie came home from school one day and found that her 
little sister had spilled cookie crumbs all o~er the living 
room floor. Susie decided to clean them up with a vacuum 
cleaner. But while Susie was cleaning up, the vacuum 
cleaner bumped into a lamp. The lamp fell to the floor 
and smashed to pieces. 
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Story 7: 
Ed didn't know the names of the streets very well, and he 
was not sure where Main Street was. One day a man came up 
to Ed and asked him where Main Street was. So Ed said, "I 
think it's that way." But it was not that way. The man 
really got lost and could not find the place he was looking 
for. 
Joe knew the names of the streets very well. One day a man 
came up to Joe and asked him where Main Street was. But 
Joe wanted to play a little trick on the man and he said, 
"It's that way," and he pointed the wrong way. But the man 
didn't really get lost because he found his way again. 
Story 8: 
Mary's mommy had just finished baking some cookies for 
dessert one night. But Mary was very hungry and she didn't 
want to wait until after dinner. So when her mommy went 
into the living room Mary ate one cookie. 
Alice and her parents went to the circus one day. Alice 
asked her mommy if she could get some chocolate candy. Her 
mother said O.K. Alice was having such a good time watch-
ing the circus that she forgot she was holding the candy. 
It melted on her new party dress and made a big stain. 
Story 9: 
One day Billy asked his friend if he could borrow his 
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bicycle for a little while. His friend said that would be 
O.K. But while Billy was riding his friend's bike, he hit 
a bump in the road and the front wheel of the bike got all 
smashed and bent. 
Jimmy was watching some boys play ball one day. Jimmy 
asked if he could play too but the boys said no. So the 
next time the ball came close to him, Jimmy picked it up 
and threw it to the other side of the playground and one 
of the boys had to go and get it. 
Story 10: 
Martha was playing • game of hopscotch with her friend one 
day. Martha waa winning the game. But her friend made a 
real good jump at the end and 10 Martha lost the game. 
Martha didn't like that so she just stopped playing and 
went home. 
Jane was teaching her friends how to play a new game one 
day. They were having a lot of fun throwing her friend's 
new ball around. But once Jane threw the ball too far and 
a car ran over it and smashed the ball to pieces and they 
had to stop playing the game. 
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